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DUTY-TO-PROTECT CLAIMS BY INMATES
AFTER THE PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION
ACT
David K. Ries∗
Roderick Johnson was on probation in Texas for a nonviolent
burglary offense.1 In January 2000, Johnson’s probation was
revoked and, within nine months, he was transferred to a
maximum-security prison.2 The prison officials responsible for
Johnson’s cell assignment there “knew that Johnson was
homosexual and possessed an effeminate manner,”3 but placed him
in the prison’s general population after telling him “‘we don’t
protect punks on this farm.’”4 Soon afterward a prison gang
asserted ownership over Johnson and forced him into daily sex
acts.5 Throughout his eighteen-month stay in prison, Johnson
∗
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1
Roderick Keith Johnson v. Gary Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 512 (5th Cir.
2004).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Adam Liptak, Ex-Inmate’s Suit Offers View into Sexual Slavery in
Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at A1.
“The Crips already had a homosexual that was with them,” Mr.
Johnson explained. “The Gangster Disciples, from what I understand,
hadn’t had a homosexual under them in a while. So that’s why I was
automatically, like, given to them.” According to court papers and
[Johnson’s] own detailed account, the Gangster Disciples and then
other gangs treated Mr. Johnson as a sex slave. They bought and sold
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“sought help from guards, filed numerous ‘life-endangerment’
forms, and wrote letters to prison administrators,” but he remained
in the facility’s general population.6 During those eighteen months,
Johnson was passed among various prison gangs, and rape became
a routine part of his prison life.7
Prison rape, disturbingly a running joke in popular culture,8 is
conservatively estimated to occur 12,000 times a year and affect
nearly thirteen percent of the nation’s prisoners.9 In 1994, in
Farmer v. Brennan,10 the Supreme Court held that no legitimate
penological purpose is served by allowing rape to occur within

him, and they rented him out. Some sex acts cost $5, others $10.
Id.
6

Johnson, 385 F.3d at 513.
Liptak, supra note 5, at A1. “‘I was forced into oral sex and anal sex on a
daily basis,’ said Mr. Johnson, who has been living in a boarding house [in
Austin, Texas] since his release in December [2003]. ‘Not for a month or two.
For, like, 18 months.’” Id.
8
Sabrina Qutb & Lara Stemple, Selling a Soft Drink, Surviving Hard Time
Just What Part of Prison Rape Do You Find Amusing?, S.F. CHRON., June 9,
2002, at D2, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/
chronicle/archive/2002/06/09/IN181350.DTL.
9
The Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15601(2) (2005)
(“[E]xperts have conservatively estimated that at least 13% of the inmates in the
United States have been sexually assaulted in prison”). The estimate of 12,000
rapes comes from the corrections industry. Eli Lehrer, A Blind Eye, Still Turned:
Getting Serious About Prison Rape, NAT’L REVIEW, June 2, 2003, at 10. “Even
if this is the actual number, it still represents more rapes than are reported
annually against women in New York City, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Boston,
San Diego, and Phoenix combined.” Id. Higher estimates have been made.
Extrapolating from the findings of a study of Nebraska’s prison system by
Professor Cindy Struckman-Johnson of the University of South Dakota to the
national level, Human Rights Watch cites a total of more than 140,000 inmates
who have been anally raped while in prison. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO
ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS 130 (2001) [hereinafter NO ESCAPE],
available at http://www.hrw.org/ reports/2001/prison. These rapes occur within
a national prison system of federal and state facilities that, in 2001, held at least
24,147 prisoners known to be HIV-positive. LAURA MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, HIV IN PRISONS, 2001 2 (2004) [hereinafter HIV IN PRISONS 2001],
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/hivp01.pdf.
10
511 U.S. 825 (1994).
7
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prisons.11 Further, the Court held that inmates who are raped in
prison due to the “deliberate indifference” of prison officials suffer
cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.12 This decision was handed
down fourteen years after Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent in
United States v. Bailey that rape was a fact of prison life.13
Johnson’s case suggests that this continues to be true in 2005.14
Once a prisoner has been raped, or “turned out” in prison
parlance,15 that prisoner (or “punk”)16 can expect to be
continuously raped by other sexual predators and shared among
prison gang members throughout his sentence.17 Alternatively, the
prisoner’s body may become the property of a single dominating
prisoner.18 This occurs despite the Supreme Court’s statement that
sexual assault is “simply not part of the penalty that criminal

11

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (holding that “allowing the beating or rape of
one prisoner by another serves no ‘legitimate penological objective’”).
12
Id. at 832-33.
13
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 421 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) “A youthful inmate can expect to be subjected to homosexual gang
rape his first night in jail or, it has been said, even in the van on the way to jail.
Weaker inmates become the property of stronger prisoners or gangs, who sell
the sexual services of the victim.” Id. (footnote omitted).
14
Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2004).
15
NO ESCAPE, supra note 9, at 90-91.
16
Id. at 93.
17
Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 929 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
The evidence before this court revealed a prison underworld in which
rapes, beatings, and servitude are the currency of power. Inmates who
refuse to join race-based gangs may be physically or sexually assaulted.
To preserve their physical safety, some vulnerable inmates simply
subject to being bought and sold among groups of prison predators,
providing their oppressors with commissary goods, domestic services,
or sexual favors.
Id.
18
Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2004). In presenting the facts
of the case, the Court of Appeals described Roderick Johnson’s experience,
writing that “[i]n October 2000, not long after his arrival in the general
population, a prison gang member named Hernandez asserted ‘ownership’ over
Johnson, forcing Johnson to become his sexual servant.” Id. at 512.
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offenders pay for their offenses against society.”19
The 108th Congress endeavored to rid U.S. prisons of sexual
assault by passing the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003
(PREA).20 Congress incorporated into the statute a cause of action
under Farmer for inmates who have been subjected to rape.21
Additionally, Congress authorized funding for the Bureau of
Justice Statistics to study this issue and created the National Prison
Rape Elimination Commission to recommend national standards
for eradicating prison rape.22 The PREA, by mandating the
collection of records and the creation of standards for prison
management, may aid future plaintiffs who, like Johnson, bring
legal claims against prison officials who fail in their duty to protect
prisoners from sexual assault by other prisoners.
Both Congress and the Supreme Court have now expressed the
need for prison administrators to address inmate-on-inmate rape in

19

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). The Court held that “[prison] conditions
that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not
unconstitutional. To the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even
harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses
against society.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
20
Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972
(2003) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601-15609). For discussion of the lobbying
effort behind the passage of the Prison Rape Elimination Act, see James E.
Robertson, Compassionate Conservatism and Prison Rape: The Prison Rape
Elimination Act, 30 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 3-8 (2004).
21
42 U.S.C. § 15601(13) (2005). Presuming that Congress knew the case
law on prison rape, the PREA was passed in part to further inform the meaning
of liability for deliberate indifference to rape.
The high incidence of sexual assault within prisons involves actual and
potential violations of the United States Constitution. In Farmer v.
Brennan, the Supreme Court ruled that deliberate indifference to the
substantial risk of sexual assault violates prisoners’ rights under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Id. (citation omitted). “Fighting prison rape is also affirmatively mandated by
the Constitution.” 149 CONG. REC. H7765 (daily ed. July 25, 2003) (statement of
Rep. Robert C. Scott).
22
42 U.S.C. §§ 1560304, 15606 (2005). See infra Parts III.A., III.B for
discussion of the Prison Rape Elimination Act.

RIES MACROED CORRECTED 053105.DOC

THE PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT

6/6/2005 1:43 PM

919

correctional facilities.23 However, Congress’s effort to eliminate
prison rape may be undermined by the discretion the statute affords
to federal and state executive bodies in implementing preventive
programs.24 Officials responsible for state prison systems may
continue to deny the extent of prison rape within their facilities,
while facility administrators may continue to tolerate its
existence.25 Therefore, to have their constitutional rights
23

MATHEW BENDER & CO. CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS TREATISE § 2.09(C)
(2004). “Prison officials have a clearly established duty not to be deliberately
indifferent to physical or sexual assaults or the possibility of such assaults on
inmates by other inmates.” Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 525 U.S. 825 (1994));
42 U.S.C. § 15601(13) (2005) (incorporating the Supreme Court’s holding into
the PREA by stating that “[i]n Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court ruled that
deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of sexual assault violates prisoners’
rights under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment”) (citation omitted).
24
See Olga Giller, Note and Comment, Patriarchy on Lockdown:
Deliberate Indifference and Male Prison Rape, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 659,
688-89 (2004) (writing of the PREA that “eradicating prison rape takes more
than passing legislation and setting legal precedent. . . . While physical changes
in prison administration will assist in ameliorating the scourge of prison rape,
only structural change will prove lasting”). See also Carla I. Barrett, Note, Does
the Prison Rape Elimination Act Adequately Address the Problems Posed by
Prison Overcrowding? If Not, What Will?, 39 N. ENG. L. REV. 391 (2005).
Opponents to the PREA feel that the Act is simply an empty gesture
that does show high-level governmental recognition of the problem of
prison rape, but does not provide for any real remedy. Robert Weisberg
and David Mills, writing for MSN Slate, claim that “the main thing the
law aims to do is collect data,” a goal that will prove difficult because
of “unreliable observations and underreporting inherent in prison
assault” and redundant because many reports produced by various
organizations across the country provide the same information that the
government seeks to obtain.
Id. at 427 (citing Robert Weisberg & David Mills, Violence Silence: Why No
One Really Cares About Prison Rape, MSN SLATE, Oct. 1, 2003, at
http://slate.msn.com/id/2089095).
25
Within state systems, prison officials deny that the problem of prison
rape is as substantial as prisoners, or even prison staff, report. NO ESCAPE, supra
note 9, at 133-35. Whereas staff at three Nebraska state prisons estimated that
sixteen percent of inmates “were being pressured or forced into sexual contact”
in a 1996 study, id. at 135, over half of all state corrections departments officials
surveyed by Human Rights Watch reported that sexual assault occurred too

RIES MACROED CORRECTED 053105.DOC

920

6/6/2005 1:43 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

vindicated, inmates will be forced to bring suits that rely on
Farmer, but will prevail only when they can show that “deliberate
indifference” by wardens or other prison officials contributed to
the assaults they endured.26 Federal courts may grant
administrators discretion in prisoners’ rights cases,27 but this
discretion should not include the power to ignore the threat of
sexual assault to prisoners under their control.
This note explores the potential uses of the PREA in litigation
brought by inmates against prison officials for “deliberate
indifference” to the threat of rape. Part I describes the procedures
used and the obstacles faced by prisoners who bring lawsuits
challenging the conditions of their imprisonment. Part II discusses
the Supreme Court’s “deliberate indifference” standard for holding
prison supervisors liable for Eighth Amendment violations and
examines the application of this standard by the federal courts to
claims brought by prisoners in response to assaults within prisons.
Part III presents a review of the PREA and outlines some of the
prison programs that could be implemented as a result of the
legislation. Lastly, Part IV of this note discusses ways in which
future plaintiffs who sue prison officials for deliberate indifference
to a risk of sexual assault will be able to use the PREA in their
lawsuits.

infrequently to maintain data. Id. at 133.
Penal security staffs will also, if not encourage, then definitely tolerate
a homosexual relationship by a potentially troublesome prisoner,
theorizing that a prisoner who is getting some degree of emotional and
sexual gratification from his prison “wife” is less likely to cause trouble
than a prisoner who is not because he’s comfortable and, once
emotionally attached, he will not want to lose his “wife”.
WALTER RIDEAU & RON WILKBERG, LIFE SENTENCES: RAGE AND SURVIVAL
BEHIND BARS 88-89 (1992).
26
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
27
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979) (“[T]he operation of our
correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive
Branches of our Government, not the Judicial.”).
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I. PRISONER LITIGATION
Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (Section 1983), inmates can sue
prison staff for violations of their Eighth Amendment right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment.28 Lawsuits alleging harms
against a prisoner perpetrated by another prisoner are brought as
“condition-of-confinement” claims29 on the theory that when an
individual is held in custody, there is a corresponding duty
assumed by the government to ensure that the individual will
remain safe.30 Only in the last quarter of the twentieth century have
prisoner challenges to conditions of confinement been recognized
by the Supreme Court as valid claims under the Eighth
Amendment.31 This expansion of constitutional protection has
28

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005). In relevant part, the statute states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
Id. See infra Part I.A. Federal officials are sued for violations of prisoners’ rights
in actions known as “Bivens claims” pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). For city officials who are responsible for the conditions of
city jails, liability under Section 1983 is controlled by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Monell v. Dep’t of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
29
See infra part I.B. Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 352 (6th Cir.
2001). “Where the harm is perpetrated by another prisoner, rather than by a
government official, the claim is characterized as one of ‘conditions of
confinement,’ rather than of ‘excessive use of government force.’” Id. (quoting
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 400-01 (6th Cir. 1999)).
30
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189,
199-200 (1989). “[W]hen the State takes a person into custody and holds him
there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to
assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.” Id.
31
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981) (describing expansion
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since been limited by further decisions of the Supreme Court and
by Congress’s passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.32
A. Prisoner Claims under Section 1983
Section 1983 provides a right of action for a person who
suffers “a deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution” under color of law.33 State prisoners
may bring claims under this statute34 for violations of their First
Amendment rights to expression,35 association,36 and religion,37 as
well as their due process rights,38 privacy rights under the Fourth
Amendment,39 and Eighth Amendment rights.40 Federal prisoners
are able to bring similar claims against federal prison officials,
known as “Bivens claims,” following the Supreme Court’s
of Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment “beyond the
barbarous physical punishments at issue in the Court’s earliest cases” to reach
conditions “that are ‘totally without penological justification”) (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
32
See infra Part I.C.
33
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005).
34
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (discussing reasons for applying
Section 1983 to the states and stating of the Act that one “aim was to provide a
federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not
available in practice”).
35
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (hearing a claim brought by
California state inmates under § 1983 to challenge censorship of prisoner mail).
36
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (hearing a claim brought by
Missouri state inmates to challenge prison restrictions on inmate-to-inmate
communications as well as inmate marriages).
37
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 347 (1987) (hearing a claim
brought by New Jersey state inmates under § 1983 challenging prison regulation
that prevented them from attending a Muslim congregational service).
38
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 476 (1995) (hearing a claim brought by
a Hawaii state inmate under § 1983 for a deprivation of procedural due process
in connection with a prison disciplinary hearing).
39
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 520 (1984) (hearing a claim brought by
a Virginia state inmate under § 1983 challenging a search of his cell for
contraband as unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
40
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (hearing a claim brought by a
Louisiana state inmate under § 1983 for guards’ use of excessive force).
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decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics.41 The Supreme Court has held that
supervisors of state employees may be held liable for their
subordinates’ conduct under Section 1983 only when there is an
“affirmative link” between a violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional
rights and the supervisor’s own official conduct.42 In the context of
an inmate’s lawsuit, the Court held that Section 1983 “contains no
state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a
violation of the underlying constitutional right.”43 Thus,
supervisors can only be held liable for their own culpable conduct,
not for that of their subordinates through respondeat superior.44
Supervisors may be liable for “failure to supervise”45 as well as
“failure to train” employees under their control.46 A supervisor’s
41

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that federal courts have jurisdiction over claims of
constitutional rights violations under 28 U.S.C. § 1331); see also Michael Irvine,
Excerpts from a Jailhouse Lawyer’s Manual, Fifth Edition: Chapter 17: Using
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1331 to Obtain Relief from Violations of
Federal Law, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 305, 349 (2000) [hereinafter
Jailhouse Lawyer’s Manual § 1983].
42
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976) (holding that supervisors of
the Philadelphia police department were not liable for unconstitutional
mistreatment by police officers because “there was no affirmative link between
the occurrence of the various incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of
any plan or policy by [the defendants]—express or otherwise—showing their
authorization or approval of such misconduct”). See Kit Kinports, The Buck
Does Not Stop Here: Supervisory Liability in Section 1983 Cases, 1997 U. ILL.
L. REV. 147, 151-52 (1997) [hereinafter Kinports].
43
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1986) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant where inmate claimed a negligent deprivation of liberty
without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because he suffered
injuries caused by defendant’s misplacement of a pillowcase in a jailhouse
stairway).
44
Kinports, supra note 42, at 153 (describing that Monell v. Dep’t of
Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), “signaled the Court’s unwillingness to
impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors”).
45
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 n.58 (“By our decision in Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362 (1976), we would appear to have decided that the mere right to control
without any control or direction having been exercised and without any failure
to supervise is not enough to support § 1983 liability.”).
46
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (holding that
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direct participation in a constitutional rights violation also will
make that supervisor liable under Section 1983, as will the creation
of policies or customs that lead to a foreseeable violation.47 Noting
that the Supreme Court has not established a standard for
supervisory liability under Section 1983 separate from the
constitutional standard applied to violations of the specific right
alleged, Professor Kit Kinports has identified various factors that
courts of appeals use in assessing supervisors’ culpability:
[T]he courts of appeals tend to agree that five interrelated
factors ought to be considered in applying that
[constitutional] standard and determining whether a
particular supervisor is liable on the facts of a given case:
(1) the extent to which prior similar incidents have
occurred; (2) the supervisor’s response to those prior
incidents; (3) the supervisor’s response to the specific
incident on which the suit is based; (4) the extent to which
the supervisor can be considered a cause of the violation;
and (5) the nature of the supervisor’s awareness of the
constitutional misconduct.48
Since state governments are immune from legal claims by way
of the Eleventh Amendment,49 courts must find individual officials
“inadequacy of [government employee] training may serve as the basis for §
1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference
to the rights of persons with whom the [employees] come into contact”). For
cases applying “failure to train” liability to supervisors, see Kinports, supra note
42, at 165-68.
47
Jailhouse Lawyer’s Manual § 1983, supra note 41, at 308.
48
Kinports, supra note 42, at 169.
Although the courts agree that these are the relevant considerations,
they have not been consistent in applying them. As a result, the courts
have reached contrary outcomes in similar cases, seemingly without
any regard to the particular standard of supervisory liability they
purport to be applying. And all too often, they have been unduly
generous in ruling in favor of supervisory officials.
Id.
49
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986).
The [Eleventh] Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
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liable for their injuries to provide prisoners with redress. Individual
officials whose conduct is within the scope of Section 1983 may
nevertheless be immune from liability. The Supreme Court held in
Imbler v. Pachtman, for example, that legislators, judges, and
prosecutors receive absolute immunity when sued under Section
1983, unless they commit “willful deprivations of Constitutional
rights.”50 Other government officials avoid liability under Section
1983 when they act in their “official capacities.”51 However,
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. Department
of Social Services, officials can be sued under Section 1983 for
their execution of a government policy or custom when that policy
or custom is the “moving force of the constitutional violation”
alleged.52 This has provided the means for holding government
supervisors liable when those supervisors represent government
policy.53
Government officials may be found liable for damages when
their conduct is beyond the scope of their official capacities; thus,
they are said to have “qualified immunity.”54 The doctrine of
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.” This language expressly encompasses only suits brought against
a State by citizens of another State, but this Court long ago held that the
Amendment bars suits against a State by citizens of that same State as
well.
Id. (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)).
50
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976).
51
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that
“neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’
under § 1983”).
52
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be
said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government
as an entity is responsible under § 1983. . . . [T]his case unquestionably
involves official policy as the moving force of the constitutional
violation.
Id.
53
Id. at 694.
54
Id. at 707 (Powell, J., concurring). “It has been clear that a public official
may be held liable in damages when his actions are found to violate a
constitutional right and there is no qualified immunity.” Id. (citing Wood v.
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qualified immunity deems government officials liable only when
“it would be clear to a reasonable official that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted.”55 This applies to all 1983
claims and severely limits the ability of plaintiffs to win damages
under Section 1983.56 To defeat a government official’s motion for
qualified immunity, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that a
violation of federal or constitutional law indeed occurred and then
proceed to show that the violated law was clearly established and
that a reasonable official would have understood his conduct to be
a violation.57 When defendants prevail on grounds of qualified
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978)).
55
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).
56
Sheldon Nahomad, From the Courtroom to the Street: Court Orders and
Section 1983, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 613, 637-38 (2002).
The damages remedy functions not only to deter unconstitutional
conduct but also to compensate innocent people as a matter of
corrective justice. Regrettably, however, the Supreme Court has all too
often emphasized the possible over-deterrence of government officials
and employees at the expense of providing corrective justice to those
harmed by unconstitutional conduct. It is fair to say that this move has
been based on the Court’s intuition about the non-meritorious nature of
many 1983 claims, to say nothing of its concern for federalism, and its
apparent distaste for many 1983 plaintiffs, especially prisoners. It was
on such grounds, for example, that the Court transformed qualified
immunity, originally a defense to liability, into an immunity from suit,
effectively converting it, primarily for instrumental reasons, into a kind
of absolute immunity.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
57
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02.
A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must
consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most
favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the
officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? . . . [T]he next,
sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. . . .
The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is
clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer
that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.
Id. Relying on Supreme Court decisions is the most persuasive means for a
plaintiff to claim that the right allegedly violated was clearly-established at the
time of their injury. Daugherty v. Campbell, 935 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the Sixth Circuit looks “first to decisions of the Supreme Court” in
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immunity, plaintiffs’ constitutional harms may be left
uncompensated, and only plaintiffs who seek injunctive relief or
take solace in further establishing the law for future litigants will
be satisfied.58
For plaintiffs using Section 1983 to remedy a constitutional
harm, injunctive relief is generally available as are both
compensatory and punitive damages.59 Only when state and
municipal officials are sued in their “individual capacities,”
however, can they be held liable for monetary damages.60 Plaintiffs
suing officials in their “official capacities” can expect to receive at
most injunctive relief.61 For prisoners, both the injunctive relief
and monetary relief available under Section 1983 and through
Bivens claims have been severely limited by the Prison Litigation

determining whether rights are clearly established for purposes of qualified
immunity). Courts of Appeals decisions clearly establish the law in their own
circuits. The Supreme Court’s decision in Hope v. Pelzer, held that a
Department of Justice report warning prison officials that their conduct might
violate the Eighth Amendment provided notice sufficient to deny them qualified
immunity. 536 U.S. 730 (2002). This raises the question of what role
administrative regulations might generally play in clearly establishing law for
qualified immunity purposes. See Amanda K. Eaton, Optical Illusions: The
Hazy Contours of the Clearly Established Law and the Effects of Hope v. Pelzer
on the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, 38 GA. L. REV. 661, 709-10 (2004).
58
John C. Jeffries, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109
YALE L.J. 87, 113 (1999).
Qualified immunity disfavors the backward-looking remedy of cash
payments to victims of past harms and, in so doing, opens the door to
forward-looking remedies requiring investments in the future.
Structural reform injunctions walk through that door. They direct
resources toward preventing future harms rather than compensating
past injuries, thereby implementing the bias in favor of the future that
qualified immunity invites and allows.
Id.
59
See Daniel D. Williams, Twenty-Eighth Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: VI. Prisoners’ Rights: Procedural Means of Enforcement Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 87 GEO. L.J. 1940, 1944-45 (1999). A prevailing plaintiff may
also recover attorney’s fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2005).
60
Jailhouse Lawyer’s Manual § 1983, supra note 41, at 309.
61
Id.
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Reform Act.62 The Supreme Court also has reined in the discretion
of federal courts to fashion injunctions to prevent violations of
prisoners’ constitutional rights.63 Therefore, even successful
prisoner-plaintiffs face difficulties in obtaining meaningful relief.
B. Challenges to Conditions of Confinement
Until late in the twentieth century, the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments” was applied
only to criminal sentences.64 However, through its decisions in
Estelle v. Gamble and Rhodes v. Chapman, the Supreme Court
62

See infra Part I.C.
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (reversing a decision of the Ninth
Circuit that upheld an injunction ordering improvements to a prison system’s
law libraries).
The actual-injury requirement would hardly serve the purpose we have
described above— of preventing courts from undertaking tasks
assigned to the political branches —if once a plaintiff demonstrated
harm from one particular inadequacy in government administration, the
court were authorized to remedy all inadequacies in that administration.
The remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced
the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.
Id. at 357 (emphasis in original); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 544 (1979)
(holding that judges ought to be discouraged from managing prisons).
The court might disagree with the choice of means to effectuate
[security] interests, but it should not “second-guess the expert
administrators on matters on which they are better informed. . . .
Concern with minutiae of prison administration can only distract the
court from detached consideration of the one overriding question
presented to it: does the practice or condition violate the Constitution?”
Id. at 544 (quoting Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978)).
64
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 18 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
Until recent years, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was not
deemed to apply at all to deprivations that were not inflicted as part of
the sentence for a crime. For generations, judges and commentators
regarded the Eighth Amendment as applying only to torturous
punishments meted out by statutes or sentencing judges, and not
generally to any hardship that might befall a prisoner during
incarceration.
Id.
63
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interpreted the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the
Eighth Amendment to include prison conditions.65 These decisions
came during a period in which the federal courts had employed a
“totality-of-circumstances” analysis to issue structural injunctions
intended to prevent prison conditions from becoming overly
harsh.66
In Estelle v. Gamble, a case brought as a challenge to the level
of medical care offered in a Texas state prison, a prisoner claimed
that he had received inadequate treatment for an injury he
sustained while performing a prison work assignment.67 The
Supreme Court used its established Eighth Amendment doctrine of
measuring punishments against “evolving standards of decency” to
hold that the constitutionality of conditions of imprisonment could
65

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337 (1981). Arguments against this extension of the Eighth Amendment persist
in Supreme Court dissents by Justice Thomas and in commentary. See, e.g., Sara
Rose, Comment, “Cruel and Unusual Punishment” Need Not Be Cruel,
Unusual, or Punishment, 24 CAP. U.L. REV. 827 (1995).
66
Russel W. Gray, Note, Wilson v. Seiter: Defining the Components of and
Proposing a Direction for Eighth Amendment Prison Condition Law, 41 AM.
U.L. REV. 1339, 1352 (1992) (citing Courts of Appeals decisions from 1970
through 1985 that applied the totality of circumstances test); John Jeffries, supra
note 58, at 111-12. Professor Jeffries argues that remedies exceeded rights when
courts ordered more structural injunctions, because
courts increasingly focused on prophylactic precautions against the risk
of constitutional violations. Over time, specific remedial strategies that
recurred in one case after another assumed a life of their own. They
underwent a subtle transformation from ad hoc remedies for
independently demonstrated unconstitutionality of confinement to
normative criteria for assessing the acceptability of prison operation. In
effect, remedies became quasi-rights. . . . Whether this phenomenon is
described as remedy exceeding right or as remedy implicitly redefining
right or as remedy merely becoming a “criter[ion] by which . . .
lawfulness is judged” is for present purposes immaterial. The important
point is that in structural reform litigation, courts prospectively and
selectively impose requirements that in other remedial contexts would
not be constitutionally compelled.
Id. at 111-12 (quoting in part Note, Complex Enforcement: Unconstitutional
Prison Conditions, 94 HARV. L. REV. 626, 638 (1981)).
67
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98.
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be assessed under the Eighth Amendment.68 The Court held,
however, that whereas the “evolving standards of decency”
assessment provided an objective test for determining whether a
punishment was cruel and unusual, claims regarding conditions of
confinement required an inquiry into the subjective intent of the
prison’s officers.69 The Court adopted a “deliberate indifference”
standard for evaluating the actions of prison officials.70 The Court
required a finding of “wanton infliction of pain” in order to hold
prison officials liable for unconstitutional prison conditions.71 This
standard was intended to limit the liability of prison officials to the
creation or support of conditions that could genuinely be deemed
“cruel” under the Eighth Amendment.72 Although the Court
deemed the medical care offered to the prisoner a condition of his
confinement, it denied that any inadequacies in the prisoner’s care
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.73 The Court maintained
that, in general, defendant prison officials should be found at fault
under this standard only when the conditions are “wanton,” as only
68

Id. at 102. “[W]e have held repugnant to the Eighth Amendment
punishments which are incompatible with ‘the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
69
Id. at 105-06.
[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be
said to constitute “an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or to
be “repugnant to the conscience of mankind”. . . . In order to state a
cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It
is only such indifference that can offend “evolving standards of
decency” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Id.; Gray, supra note 66, at 1357-58 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s stateof-mind requirement for conditions of confinement derives from the Eighth
Amendment’s explicit proscription only of punishment).
70
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (“We therefore conclude that deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”) (citation
omitted).
71
Id. at 104.
72
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1991) (discussing the holding of
Estelle v. Gamble).
73
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107-08.
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then can the prison conditions at issue be considered
“punishment.”74
Having accepted that conditions of confinement could impose
constitutional harms on prisoners, the Supreme Court soon was
faced with the task of determining more precisely which conditions
merited judicial scrutiny. In Hutto v. Finney,75 a majority of the
Court held that the “interdependence of the conditions producing
the violation”76 justified “a comprehensive order to insure against
the risk of inadequate compliance.”77 Shortly thereafter, the Court
examined a challenge under the Eighth Amendment to
overcrowded prison conditions.78 In Rhodes v. Chapman, the Court
considered “whether the housing of two inmates in a single cell . . .
is cruel and unusual punishment”79 as a condition of confinement
or as the root cause of other harms suffered by inmates.80 The
majority decision held that the so-called “double-celling” of
inmates was not unconstitutional per se;81 rather, “restrictive and
74

Seiter, 501 U.S. at 300. For a discussion of the subjective element of the
Eighth Amendment’s application to conditions of confinement, as defined in
Farmer v. Brennan, see infra Part II.A.
75
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 684 (1978) (affirming an injunction
against the Arkansas prison system “that placed limits on the number of men
that could be confined in one cell, required that each have a bunk, discontinued
the ‘grue’ diet, and set 30 days as the maximum isolation sentence”).
76
Id. at 688.
77
Id. at 687.
78
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
79
Id. at 339.
80
Id. at 340.
Asserting a cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, [plaintiffs]
contended that “double celling” at [their facility] violated the
Constitution. The gravamen of their complaint was that double celling
confined cellmates too closely. It also was blamed for overcrowding at
[the prison], said to have overwhelmed the prison’s facilities and staff.
As relief, respondents sought an injunction barring petitioners, who are
Ohio officials responsible for the administration of SOCF, from
housing more than one inmate in a cell, except as a temporary measure.
Id.
81
Id. at 350. “The question before us is . . . whether the actual conditions
of confinement . . . are cruel and unusual.” Id. (emphasis added).
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even harsh” conditions were a constitutional “part of the penalty
that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”82
The Court emphasized, however, that conditions of confinement
may not be “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime
warranting imprisonment.”83
Further, the Rhodes decision refocused the inquiry conducted
by the court in Estelle and Hutto by examining whether the
allegedly unconstitutional condition caused “unquestioned and
serious deprivations of basic human needs” comprising “the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”84 The Court’s
subsequent decision in Wilson v. Seiter85 accepted this inquiry as
the objective test for evaluating prison conditions under the Eighth
Amendment, holding that, whether alone or in isolation, conditions
of confinement are cruel and unusual when they deprive prisoners
of “a single, identifiable human need.”86 In subsequent condition
of confinement cases, the Supreme Court recognized that “human
needs” include food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable

82

Id. at 347. “[C]onditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual
under contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the extent that such
conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Id.
83
Id. “Conditions must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction
of pain, nor may they be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime
warranting imprisonment.” Id.
84
Id.
In Estelle v. Gamble, we held that the denial of medical care is cruel
and unusual because, in the worst case, it can result in physical torture,
and, even in less serious cases, it can result in pain without any
penological purpose. In Hutto v. Finney, the conditions of confinement
in two Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment
because they resulted in unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic
human needs. Conditions other than those in Gamble and Hutto, alone
or in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities.
Id.
85
501 U.S. 294 (1991).
86
Id. at 304. See also Gray, supra note 66, at 1384-85 (discussing Wilson v.
Seiter’s rejection of the “totality of circumstances” test in favor of the “core
conditions” or “single identifiable human need” test).
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safety.87 The Supreme Court’s condition of confinement decisions
also clarified that state officials may be held responsible for the
constitutional harms to which inmates are exposed during
imprisonment.88
In Helling v. McKinney, the Court extended the protection of
the Eighth Amendment to prospective violations, noting that it
would be “odd” for courts to ignore the threat of future
constitutional harms.89 In that case, a prisoner challenged the
conditions of his confinement based on the imminent danger posed
by the secondhand smoke to which he was exposed by his
cellmate.90 Recognizing the potential validity of the prisoner’s
claim, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for a
determination regarding whether the conditions complained of
were sufficiently serious to satisfy both the objective and

87

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189,
199-200 (1989), and citing cases, infra note 88.
88
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1994). “It is cruel and unusual
punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions.” Id. (citing
Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 200; Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-316
(1982)); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 311 (1991) (White, J., concurring)
(“[H]aving chosen to use imprisonment as a form of punishment, a State must
ensure that the conditions in its prisons comport with the ‘contemporary
standard of decency’ required by the Eighth Amendment.”) (citing DeShaney,
489 U.S. at 198-200); id. at 199-200 (1989).
[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an
individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at
the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs—e. g., food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety—it transgresses
the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and
the Due Process Clause.
Id.; see also Will A. Smith, Comment, Civil Liability for Sexual Assault in
Prison: A Challenge to the “Deliberate Indifference” Standard, 34 CUMB. L.
REV. 289, 309-11 (2003) (describing applications of this dicta from DeShaney as
a “state-created-danger theory” of liability).
89
509 U.S. 25 (1994).
90
Id. at 28. “The complaint . . . alleged that respondent was assigned to a
cell with another inmate who smoked five packs of cigarettes a day. . . .
Respondent sought injunctive relief and damages for [prison officials]
subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment by jeopardizing his health.” Id.
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subjective tests of deliberate indifference.91 The Court held that a
challenge to a future harm requires a likelihood and seriousness
beyond what “a scientific and statistical inquiry” can provide.92 A
prisoner must show both that the future harm threatens to deprive
him of an identifiable human need and “that the risk of which he
complains is not one that today’s society chooses to tolerate.”93 In
Farmer v. Brennan, the Court resolved that protection against
sexual assault is a human need warranting protection under the
Eighth Amendment.94
C. The Prison Litigation Reform Act: An Obstacle to Prisoner
Rape Suits
In 1996, the course of prison litigation was altered still further
through Congress’s enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA).95 The PLRA was passed to address a perceived deluge of
91

Id. at 35.
Id. at 36. “[W]ith respect to the objective factor, determining whether
McKinney’s conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment requires
more than a scientific and statistical inquiry into the seriousness of the potential
harm and the likelihood that such injury to health will actually be caused by
exposure to [secondhand smoke].” Id.
93
Id. For a more complete discussion of the Court’s treatment of imminent
dangers in Helling v. McKinney, see Katherine L. Frazier, Comment,
Constitutional Law – Helling v. McKinney: Future Risks of Harm Actionable
Under the Eighth Amendment, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1479 (1995).
94
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994).
[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under
which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment. . . . [P]rison officials must ensure that inmates receive
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates. In
particular . . . prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from
violence at the hands of other prisoners. . . . [G]ratuitously allowing the
beating or rape of one prisoner by another serves no legitimate
penological objective [nor] squares with evolving standards of decency.
Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
95
Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(1996) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 3636, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 28 U.S.C. §
1346, 42 U.S.C. § 1997, and other scattered sections).
92
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frivolous and meritless prisoner claims that overwhelmed the
federal courts.96 The legislation significantly limits the types of
claims and remedies that are available to inmates.97 Indeed, in
1997, the number of prisoner civil rights suits filed decreased by
thirty-one percent;98 by 2000, that number decreased further to
forty percent less than before passage of the PLRA.99
Prior to the enactment of the PLRA, the Attorney General was
responsible for certifying that each state prison system’s grievance
procedure was in compliance with standards issued pursuant to the
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act.100 A court would
scrutinize a prison’s administrative grievance procedure before
96

Jennifer Winslow, Comment, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s
Physical Injury Requirement Bars Meritorious Lawsuits: Was It Meant To?, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1655, 1658 (2002).
PLRA proponents declared their intention to curtail the number of
frivolous and meritless inmate suits clogging the federal judiciary.
They then used exaggerated examples of inmate complaints to suggest
subtly that all inmate suits are frivolous and meritless. While
proponents provided assurances that meritorious inmate suits would not
be affected by the PLRA, they made little effort to acknowledge that
meritorious inmate suits do exist.
Id.
97
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (2005). “The court shall . . . dismiss any action
brought with respect to prison conditions . . . if the court is satisfied that the
action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” Id.
98
Randall S. Jeffrey, Restricting Prisoners’ Equal Access to the Federal
Courts: The Three Strikes Provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act and
Substantive Equal Protection, 49 BUFFALO L. REV. 1099, 1108 n.29 (2001)
(citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597 n.18 (1998) (citing ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 28 tbl. C-2 (2000)).
99
Brian J. Ostrom et al., Congress, Courts and Corrections: An Empirical
Perspective on the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1525,
1525 (2003).
100
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub L. No. 96-247, 94
Stat. 349 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997j (1994)). For discussion of
how this certification program was administered ineffectively by the Justice
Department, see Note, Resolving Prisoners’ Grievances Out of Court: 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1309, 1320 (1991).
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deciding whether to dismiss the inmate’s claim for failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies.101 The PLRA, however,
limited judicial scrutiny of grievance procedures to the simple
question of whether a prison made any remedies available through
a grievance procedure.102 Thus, under the PLRA, federal courts
will dismiss a Section 1983 suit brought by a prisoner if
administrative remedies are available and the prisoner has failed to
exhaust them.103 The PLRA also raised the stakes for dismissals of
claims by enacting a “three strikes” provision for prisoners’ court
fee waivers.104 Prisoners whose lawsuits were “dismissed on the
grounds that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a
claim” on three prior occasions would become ineligible for fee
waivers in all future actions or appeals.105
Under the PLRA, in order to prevail on a claim for
compensatory damages, a prisoner must demonstrate a physical

101

42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1994). See Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation
Reform Act’s Enigmatic Exhaustion Requirement: What It Means and What
Congress, Courts and Correctional Officials Can Learn From It, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 483 (2001).
102
Branham, supra note 101, at 498. “The only substantive requirement
remaining on the face of [42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)] that administrative remedies
must meet in order for the exhaustion requirement to apply is that the remedies
be ‘available.’” Id.
103
42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) was amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
to make exhaustion of administrative remedies a requirement of litigation. “No
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2005).
104
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2005).
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in
a civil action or proceeding [in forma pauperis] if the prisoner has, on 3
or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility,
brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was
dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under
imminent danger of serious physical injury.
Id.
105
Id. Jeffrey, supra note 98, at 1133.
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injury.106 Congress categorically denied recovery for mental and
emotional injuries to prisoners without evidence of “actual injury,”
a requirement that the federal courts already maintained.107 The
PLRA also placed limitations on the injunctive relief available to
inmates.108 The statute mandates that federal courts may order only
narrowly-drawn injunctions that address the likelihood of a
specific injury’s reoccurring.109 Despite these restrictions,
prisoners continue to bring suits asking courts to enjoin prison
supervisors and improve unsafe conditions.110
106

42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2005). “Limitation on recovery. No Federal civil
action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other
correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury.” Id.
107
See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978) (“[A]lthough mental and
emotional distress caused by the denial of procedural due process itself is
compensable under § 1983, we hold that neither the likelihood of such injury nor
the difficulty of proving it is so great as to justify awarding compensatory
damages without proof that such injury actually was caused.”); Slicker v.
Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225, 1229 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that “compensatory
damages under § 1983 may be awarded only based on actual injuries caused by
the defendant and cannot be presumed or based on the abstract value of the
constitutional rights that the defendant violated”) (citing Carey, 435 U.S. at 264;
Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 309 (1986));
But see Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718, 719 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
“mental injury suffices for Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment
cases”). For a discussion of how the physical injury requirement fails to further
the goals of the PLRA and may be unconstitutional, see Jennifer Winslow,
Comment, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Physical Injury Requirement
Bars Meritorious Lawsuits: Was It Meant To?, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1655 (2002).
108
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) (2005). “Prospective relief . . . shall extend no
further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular
plaintiff.” Id. § 3626(a)(1)(A). “Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly
drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds
requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct
that harm.” Id. § 3626(a)(2).
109
Id. § 3626(a). “The court shall not grant or approve any prospective
relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further
than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least
intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” Id.
110
See Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63 (3d Cir. 1996) (inmates housed in
protective custody sought injunctive relief challenging conditions of their
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In the context of prison sexual assault cases, the PLRA creates
numerous procedural hurdles. Researchers have noted that the
Act’s exhaustion requirement is particularly problematic because
inmates fear retaliation from their assailants if they make use of
administrative grievance procedures by reporting threats or even
actual assaults.111 Further, the physical injury requirement calls for
evidence that prison medical or psychiatric facilities may not
reliably collect or maintain.112 Moreover, in seeking injunctive
relief, prisoner-plaintiffs basing their claims on continuing threats
of assault have a difficult burden in proving the likelihood that
they will be attacked again in the future.113 Finally, the PLRA
could limit relief to an order concerning a specific cellmate’s
protective custody status, excluding broader suits that would
protect other inmates as well.114

confinement in relation to general population inmates); Skinner v. Uphoff, 234
F. Supp. 2d 1208 (D. Wyo. 2002) (inmates who suffered a risk of assault from
their conditions of confinement at a Wyoming state prison prevailed in having
the court instruct prison management to consent to enforcement of specific
administrative regulations already in place at the facility).
111
See Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2001) (deciding a
suit brought by a father after his son was murdered in prison by another inmate
who mistakenly “accused Flint of ‘ratting’ on him”); Cindy Struckman-Johnson
& David Struckman-Johnson, Sexual Coercion Rates in Seven Midwestern
Prison Facilities for Men, 80 THE PRISON J. 379, 380 (2000). “[M]any
researchers have noted that sexual assault is likely to be underreported by male
inmates because of fears of reprisals, unwillingness to be a ‘snitch,’ and fear of
being labeled a homosexual or weak.” Id. (citations omitted).
112
Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661, 669 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming plaintiffs’
award of nominal damages for multiple rapes because no “objective medical
evidence supporting their physical injuries or detailing the extent of their
emotional injuries” was presented at trial).
113
Id. at 674 (“Although [plaintiff] claims that he is still subject to threats
from fellow inmates, he does not claim that he is still subject to sexual
assault.”).
114
Cf. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 347 (2000) (holding that “[t]he
PLRA has restricted courts’ authority to issue and enforce prospective relief
concerning prison conditions, requiring that such relief be supported by findings
and precisely tailored to what is needed to remedy the violation of a federal
right”).
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II. SUPERVISORY LIABILITY FOR INMATE-ON-INMATE ASSAULTS
In Rhodes v. Chapman, the Supreme Court addressed the
problem of prison overcrowding and held that officials have no
general duty to make prisons “free of discomfort.”115 Officials in
that case were not liable for inmate-on-inmate assaults under the
Eighth Amendment where those assaults were claimed to be a
result of overcrowded conditions and the double-celling of
inmates.116 In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court heard the
case of a prisoner who claimed an Eighth Amendment violation
grounded in the fact that prison officials had imposed
unconstitutional conditions on the prisoner specifically and had
allowed the prisoner to be assaulted by other inmates.117 The
“deliberate indifference” standard defined in that decision has
115

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 336, 349 (1981). “[T]he Constitution
does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons . . . which house persons
convicted of serious crimes, cannot be free of discomfort.” Id.
116
Id. at 342-43, 348-49. “As to violence, the [trial] court found that the
number of acts of violence at [the prison] had increased with the prison
population, but only in proportion to the increase in population. Respondents
failed to produce evidence establishing that double celling itself caused greater
violence . . . .” Id. at 342-43. This led the Court to hold that “there is no
evidence that double celling under these circumstances either inflicts
unnecessary or wanton pain or is grossly disproportionate to the severity of
crimes warranting imprisonment.” Id. at 348. But see id. at 375. “There is no
dispute that the prison was violent even before it become overcrowded, and that
it has become more so. Contrary to the contention by the majority, I do not
assert that violence has increased due to double celling. I accept the finding of
the District Court that violence has increased due to overcrowding.” Id.
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphases and citations excluded).
117
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
[Plaintiff’s] complaint alleged that respondents either transferred
petitioner to [a particular facility] or placed petitioner in [that prison’s]
general population despite knowledge that the penitentiary had a
violent environment and a history of inmate assaults, and despite
knowledge that petitioner, as a transsexual who “projects feminine
characteristics,” would be particularly vulnerable to sexual attack by
some [of the prison’s] inmates. This allegedly amounted to a
deliberately indifferent failure to protect petitioner’s safety, and thus to
a violation of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment rights.
Id. at 830-31.
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since been applied to claims in which there is a connection
between a prison official’s conduct and the assault of an inmate by
another inmate.118 Prisoners have sought to hold supervisors liable
in this way for conditions such as those unsuccessfully challenged
in Rhodes v. Chapman.119 Some circuits have held that when a
prisoner’s particular double-cell assignment leads to a violent
assault, a prison supervisor may be found liable for deliberate
indifference to the prisoner’s safety.120
A. THE FARMER DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD
Following Estelle v. Gamble, federal courts differed with
respect to the mental state required to subject prison officials to
liability for prison conditions.121 Ten years after it considered the
objective seriousness of injuries suffered by prisoners to find
Eighth Amendment violations in Rhodes v. Chapman, the Court
refocused the Eighth Amendment test on an inquiry into the
mindset of prison officials in Wilson v. Seiter.122 The Court
cautioned that a condition’s effect on an inmate was not
determinative of a violation of the Eighth Amendment; rather, a
prison official’s actions in subjecting an inmate to a specific
condition of confinement, taken with deliberate indifference to the
violation of an inmate’s rights, would determine the existence of
an Eighth Amendment violation.123
Almost twenty years after defining the deliberate indifference
standard for conditions of confinement claims in Estelle v.
118

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C. (discussing cases arising out of assaults that
allegedly occurred because of prisons’ use of double-celling).
120
See infra Part II.C.
121
Compare Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (“In Estelle v.
Gamble . . . we said . . . only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
implicates the Eighth Amendment”) (emphasis in original), with Stokes v.
Delacambre, 710 F.2d 1120, 1126 (5th Cir. 1983) (describing that the decision
in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), “specifically upheld a standard of
recklessness”).
122
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
123
Id. at 303.
119
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Gamble, the Court decided Farmer v. Brennan and more clearly
defined for the federal courts the requirements of the deliberate
indifference standard.124 This clarification came in the context of a
prison rape claim.125 Dee Farmer, an eighteen-year-old transsexual
convicted of credit card fraud, was placed in the general population
of a federal prison and was raped numerous times by fellow
inmates.126 Farmer brought a pro se civil suit against the prison’s
warden and guards for failing to protect her from an ongoing threat
of foreseeable sexual assault.127
The Farmer decision reaffirmed that conditions of confinement
could be violative of the Eighth Amendment.128 Further, the Court
set forth a two-prong test for determining when prison officials
could be held liable for constitutional rights violations related to
prison conditions.129 Under the first prong, courts must consider
whether the prison conditions were “objectively, sufficiently
serious.”130 This prong makes use of the standard set forth in
124

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994).
Id. at 830 (stating that “according to petitioner’s allegations, petitioner
was beaten and raped by another inmate in petitioner’s cell. . . . [P]etitioner then
filed a Bivens complaint, alleging a violation of the Eighth Amendment”).
126
Id. at 829 (describing that the plaintiff, Dee Farmer, “underwent
estrogen therapy, received silicone breast implants, and submitted to
unsuccessful ‘black-market’ testicle-removal surgery”); Farmer v. Brennan, 81
F.3d 1444, 1445 (7th Cir. 1996). “Farmer is serving a twenty year federal
sentence for credit card fraud, which was imposed in 1986 when she was 18
years old.” Id.
127
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994). This note uses the female
pronoun to refer to Dee Farmer because, as stated by the Seventh Circuit in a
decision following the Supreme Court’s remand of the case, “Farmer uses the
female pronoun to refer to herself, despite the fact that she is still biologically
male. We will respect that preference . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 81 F.3d 1444,
1445 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996).
128
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. “[T]reatment a prisoner receives in prison and
the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the
Eighth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31
(1993)).
129
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “[A] prison official violates the Eighth
Amendment only when two requirements are met.” Id.
130
Id. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)).
125
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Rhodes v. Chapman, which requires that the conditions challenged
must deprive a plaintiff of a human need.131 To claim that prison
officials failed to prevent a violation of an inmate’s need for safety
under the objective prong, a plaintiff must demonstrate “conditions
posing a substantial risk of serious harm.”132
Under the second prong, the Court must determine whether
prison officials had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”133 In
clarifying the subjective prong of the standard, the Court
considered both civil standards for liability as well as different
criminal mental states.134 Although prisoners’ rights litigation
consists of civil lawsuits, the Court adopted something akin to the
criminal standard of “subjective recklessness.”135 The result was a
131

Id. at 834 (holding that “a prison official’s act or omission must result in
the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities”) (citing Rhodes
v. Chapman, 425 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
132
Id. at 834. “For a claim (like the one here) based on a failure to prevent
harm, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. (citing McKinney, 509 U.S. at 35).
133
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. As described by Judge Posner in a Seventh
Circuit prisoner rape case:
Prison employees who act with deliberate indifference to the inmates’
safety violate the Eighth Amendment. But to be guilty of “deliberate
indifference” they must know they are creating a substantial risk of
bodily harm. If they place a prisoner in a cell that has a cobra, but they
do not know that there is a cobra there (or even that there is a high
probability that there is a cobra there), they are not guilty of deliberate
indifference even if they should have known about the risk, that is,
even if they were negligent—even grossly negligent or even reckless in
the tort sense—in failing to know. But if they know that there is a cobra
there or at least that there is a high probability of a cobra there, and do
nothing, that is deliberate indifference.
Billman v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted).
134
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37. “With deliberate indifference lying
somewhere between the poles of negligence at one end and purpose or
knowledge at the other,” the Court considered the civil and criminal standards of
“recklessness,” as well as the civil liability standard of “gross negligence.” Id. at
836-37; see also id. at 836 n.4 (dismissing gross negligence as “typically
meaning little different from recklessness as generally understood in the civil
law”).
135
Id. at 839-40 (stating “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal
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deliberate indifference standard “somewhere between the poles of
negligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other.”136
The threshold for this standard is that an official must have been
aware or should have been aware of the unconstitutional conditions
established under the objective prong.137 The Court noted that, in
Dee Farmer’s case, the record contained statements by some
defendants admitting knowledge of Farmer’s vulnerability to
sexual assault.138 The Supreme Court generally limited the liability
of prison supervisors, however, by suggesting that “it remains open
to the [defendant] officials to prove that they were unaware even of
an obvious risk to inmate health and safety.”139
Despite this difficult standard, the language of the Farmer
decision suggests that demonstrating prison conditions that present
a general threat of rape may be sufficient to satisfy both the
objective and subjective prongs of the deliberate indifference
test.140 Courts thus might presume that a defendant had notice of a
law is a familiar and workable standard that is consistent with the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause”).
136
Id. at 836.
137
Id. at 837 (holding “a prison official cannot be found liable under the
Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement
unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate safety”).
138
Id. at 848-49.
For example, in papers filed in opposition to respondents’ summaryjudgment motion, petitioner pointed to respondents’ admission that
petitioner is a “non-violent” transsexual who, because of petitioner’s
“youth and feminine appearance” is “likely to experience a great deal
of sexual pressure” in prison. And petitioner recounted a statement by
one of the respondents, then warden of the penitentiary in Lewisburg,
Pennsylvania, who told petitioner that there was “a high probability that
[petitioner] could not safely function at USP-Lewisburg” an incident
confirmed in a published District Court opinion.
Id. (citations omitted).
139
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
140
Id. at 842-43.
For example, if an Eighth Amendment plaintiff presents evidence
showing that a substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding,
pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in
the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being
sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus
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threat to the plaintiff because the prison’s conditions posed such an
obvious risk to all inmates.141 Plaintiffs may show that a risk was
“long-standing, pervasive, well-documented or expressly noted by
prison officials in the past” and then link this information to their
supervisors’ awareness of the threat.142
Under Farmer, “[a] failure to give advance notice is not
dispositive”;143 rather, “a factfinder may conclude that a prison
official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk
was obvious.”144 Prior to Farmer, a prison guard or supervisor
could be held deliberately indifferent only when an inmate
reported a threat from a particular, identified aggressor.145 In
Farmer, however, the Court held that prison officials may be held
liable when they are aware of a risk to an inmate despite their not
knowing by whom that inmate is threatened.146 The Farmer
decision focused the inquiry of courts on the conduct of prison
officials rather than on prisoners’ own steps to inform prison

“must have known” about it, then such evidence could be sufficient to
permit a trier of fact to find that the defendant-official had actual
knowledge of the risk.
Id.
141

Thus, when a defendant is aware of prison conditions generally, “a fact
finder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the
very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id. at 842.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 848.
144
Id. at 842.
145
McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1991) (deciding
inmate-on-inmate rape claim prior to Farmer and holding that “[o]ther circuits
have held that failure to tell prison officials about threats is fatal and have
dismissed such claims at the pleading stage”) (citing Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d
792 (4th Cir. 1987); Blankenship v. Meachum, 840 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1988)).
146
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994). “Nor may a prison
official escape liability for deliberate indifference by showing that, while he was
aware of an obvious risk to inmate safety, he did not know that the complainant
was especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who eventually
committed the assault.” Id. For examples of courts using this language in
determining deliberate indifference, see Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 294
(6th Cir. 2004); Krein v. Norris, 309 F.3d 487, 491-92 (8th Cir. 2002); Lopez v.
LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 762 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999).
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officials of aggressive conduct by other inmates.147
The Court also held that defendants may prevail “if they
responded reasonably to the risk even if the harm ultimately was
not averted.”148 Indeed, the official’s response could preclude a
prisoner’s claim for an injunction, even if that response postdates
litigation.149 A prisoner seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate
a threat of future harm “in light of the prison authorities’ current
attitudes and conduct”;150 thus, the defendants “could prevent
issuance of an injunction by proving, during the litigation, that they
were no longer unreasonably disregarding an objectively
intolerable risk of harm and that they would not revert to their
obduracy upon cessation of the litigation.”151
B. Supervisors’ Liability for Reported or Obvious Threats of
Harm
Following from the Supreme Court’s precedents stating that
personal safety is a human need that cannot be deprived under the
Eighth Amendment,152 prisoners who are the victims of assault
may try to hold prison supervisors directly liable for not preventing

147

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843-44. “If, for example, prison officials were
aware that inmate rape was so common and uncontrolled . . . it would be
obviously irrelevant to liability that the officials could not guess beforehand
precisely who would attack [victims of assault].” Id.
148
Id. at 844.
149
Id. at 847 n.9 (“[E]ven prison officials who had a subjectively culpable
state of mind when the lawsuit was filed could prevent issuance of an injunction
by proving, during the litigation, that they were no longer unreasonably
disregarding an objectively intolerable risk of harm and that they would not
revert to their obduracy upon cessation of the litigation.”).
150
Id. at 845 (emphasis added).
151
Id. at 847 n.9.
152
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1994). “The [Eighth]
Amendment, as we have said, requires that inmates be furnished with the basic
human needs, one of which is ‘reasonable safety.’ It is ‘cruel and unusual
punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions.’” Id. (citing
Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 200
(1989); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982)).
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their harm.153 Without evidence establishing a direct connection
between an official’s own conduct and an inmate’s harm, however,
a warden or corrections official will be liable only for inmate-oninmate assaults the circumstances of which were within the
official’s control.154 As with other types of Section 1983 claims,
wardens and other supervisors will not be held liable for claims
against prison guards through respondeat superior.155 Rather, the
series of factors listed by Professor Kinports and quoted above will
be applied to determine supervisory liability in prisoner assault
cases.156
153

See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 512 (5th Cir. 2004) (“This
is a § 1983 suit brought by a former Texas prisoner against . . . defendant prison
officials [who] failed to protect him from prison gangs who repeatedly raped
him.”); Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 2004) (reviewing a
“[Section] 1983 suit against Warden Brigano and other prison officials resulting
out of an attack on Greene by another inmate”); Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d
1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000) (addressing a claim by the plaintiff “that the jail
officials put him with other inmates who the officials knew would attack him”).
154
LaMarca v. Turner, 662 F. Supp. 647, 663 (S.D. Fla. 1987). “Where the
defendants hold supervisory positions, vicarious liability will not suffice.” Id.
(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) for the proposition
that a municipality will not be vicariously liable for the acts of its employees
absent evidence that the injury inflicted was the result of official policy).
155
“Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under §
1983.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell, 436
U.S. at 694-95).
156
Kinports, supra note 42, at 169.
[T]he courts of appeals tend to agree that five interrelated factors ought
to be considered in . . . determining whether a particular supervisor is
liable on the facts of a given case: (1) the extent to which prior similar
incidents have occurred; (2) the supervisor’s response to those prior
incidents; (3) the supervisor’s response to the specific incident on
which the suit is based; (4) the extent to which the supervisor can be
considered a cause of the violation; and (5) the nature of the
supervisor’s awareness of the constitutional misconduct.
Id. These same factors have been used by courts considering supervisory
liability in inmate-on-inmate assault cases. For consideration of the occurrence
of prior similar incidents, see Skinner v. Uphoff, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1214 (D.
Wyo. 2002). The court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on a
claim of unconstitutional conditions at a prison, in part because the plaintiffs
demonstrated that “between one hundred and three hundred inmate assaults”
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In a case brought under Section 1983, one of the factors to be
considered in assessing supervisory liability is the supervisor’s
awareness of the constitutional misconduct for which the plaintiff
brings suit.157 Under the Farmer standard, a plaintiff-inmate has
occurred at the prison during a six year period without sufficient response from
prison supervisors.” Id. at 1214. The supervisor’s response to prior incidents was
considered in Ware v. Jackson County, 150 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 1998). The court
in that case affirmed a denial of the defendant county’s motion for judgment as a
matter of law in a suit over the plaintiff’s rape by a subordinate corrections
officer. The court stated that the corrections supervisors “were informed of the
first set of allegations against [the subordinate]. However, there is no evidence
that they were instructed to increase their supervision of [the subordinate].” Id.
at 884. The defendant-supervisor’s response to the incident before the court was
a factor in Giroux v. Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 1999). By that
decision, the court reversed summary judgment of inmate’s claim against a
supervisor, where “[a] juror could find that [defendant]’s abdication of his
responsibility [to alert subordinates on his shift of plaintiff’s protective status],
in the face of such a known danger to [plaintiff]’s safety, was a reckless
dereliction of duty.” Id. at 34. The extent to which the supervisor himself caused
the alleged incident was an important consideration in Hale v. Tallapposa
County, 50 F.3d 1579 (11th Cir. 1995). Summary judgment for a jail supervisor
was reversed where the plaintiff “presented sufficient proof of causation to
survive summary judgment,” by presenting evidence
sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination that the excessive
risk of violence [at the facility] flowed from an atmosphere of
deliberate indifference reflected in [the supervisor]’s failure to classify
or segregate violent from non-violent inmates, assign inmates to cells
or beds, adequately train the jailers, and adequately supervise and
monitor the inmates.
Id. at 1584-85. Finally, the court looked to the supervisor’s awareness of
constitutional misconduct in Skinner v. Uphoff, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (D. Wyo.
2002). Prison supervisors were found liable on a failure-to-discipline claim
because they “admitted their knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to
inmates, as well as their failure to discipline subordinates or take any other
corrective action. In light of the undisputed facts, their failure to disciple
amount[ed] to deliberate indifference.” Id. at 1216. Also, in Daskalea v. District
of Columbia, the court affirmed the district’s liability for negligent supervision
where the plaintiff inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated by
“persistent, open and notorious conduct,” which supervisors “failed to notice, let
alone stop.” 227 F.3d 433, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
157
Kinports, supra note 42, at 180-81.
The final factor that the courts of appeals tend to consider in
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the best chance of proving the subjective prong of deliberate
indifference when the inmate can show that he reported a threat of
assault to the supervisor-defendant.158 For example, a plaintiff in
Arkansas who had been sexually assaulted in prison claimed that
the warden of his facility was liable because the warden had
reviewed some of the prisoner’s requests for a change in cell
assignment.159 The trial court granted the warden judgment as a
matter of law, holding that he lacked subjective knowledge of the
risk to the plaintiff.160 The Eighth Circuit, in Spruce v. Sargent,
reversed this finding on the basis of evidence that the warden had
also received reports that were filed by the prisoner after his
cellmate forced him to perform oral sex.161 The court held that this
evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that the warden had the
notice required for deliberate indifference.162
In determining whether to hold supervisors liable under Section
1983 for inmate-on-inmate assaults, courts also consider “the
extent to which the supervisor can be considered a cause of the
violation.”163 Officials can be linked to a deprivation of
determining a supervisor’s liability for her subordinate’s
unconstitutional behavior is the nature of the supervisor’s awareness of
the risk of constitutional injury. The greater the supervisor’s awareness
of the problem, the more culpable she seems and the more likely the
courts are to conclude that their particular standard of supervisory
liability is met.
Id.
158

McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1991). “Other
circuits have held that failure to tell prison officials about threats is fatal and
have dismissed such claims at the pleading stage.” Id. (citing Fourth Circuit and
Tenth Circuit cases).
159
Spruce v. Sargent, 149 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir. 1998).
160
Id. at 785.
161
Id. at 786.
162
Id. The Court of Appeals held “that there was sufficient evidence from
which a jury could conclude that Warden Sargent knew Spruce was subject to an
excessive risk of harm from sexual assault.” Id.
163
Kinports, supra note 42, at 178.
Given Section 1983’s requirement that the defendant “subject[ ]” the
plaintiff to a violation of her constitutional rights or “cause[ ] [her] to
be [so] subjected,” and the Supreme Court’s requirement in Rizzo v.
Goode of an “affirmative link” between the supervisory official and the
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constitutional rights when their failure to train subordinates caused
those subordinates to act with deliberate indifference.164 The
connection between the resulting harm and the supervisor must be
established through proof that the failure to train employees
actually led to the violation of the individual’s constitutional
rights.165
In Lopez v. LeMaster, the Tenth Circuit found that plaintiff
Genaro Lopez failed to establish such a connection between a
government supervisor and the inmate-on-inmate assault he
suffered.166 Lopez was an arrestee in the Jackson County jail in
Oklahoma and was placed in a general population cell, where he
was threatened by another inmate.167 Although he reported the
threat to his jailer, the jailer returned Lopez to the same cell; Lopez
was subsequently beaten so severely as to leave jail the next day
with a concussion and a strained spine.168 Lopez brought suit
against the sheriff who supervised the jail, claiming that the jailer

plaintiff’s constitutional injury, causation issues often arise in cases
involving supervisory liability.
Id.
164

See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (finding municipality
liability in § 1983 suit for inadequate training of police that led to constitutional
rights violations); Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297 (2d Cir.
1992) “[M]any § 1983 claims against municipalities [are molded] into ‘failure to
train’ or ‘failure to supervise’ claims. It is only by casting claims in this way that
plaintiffs can link an actual decision by a high level municipal official to a
challenged incident.” Id. The court went on to discuss the application of City of
Canton v. Harris to a claim that New York City was liable for its failure to train
police not to cover up exculpatory evidence or to commit perjury.
165
See Wilson v. Town of Mendon, 294 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2002). “Liability
will attach to the municipal employer . . . where a specific deficiency in training
is the ‘moving force’ behind a constitutional injury.” Id. (citing City of Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89, 391); Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 923 (10th
Cir. 2001). “[W]hen a superior’s failure to train amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom his subordinates come into
contact, the inadequacy of training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability.”
Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
166
Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 760 (10th Cir. 1999).
167
Id. at 758.
168
Id. at 758-59.
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to whom he complained was not properly trained.169 This failureto-train claim could not be sustained, however, because following
his assault Lopez could not identify the jailer to whom he had
reported the incident.170 In addressing Lopez’s appeal of a
summary judgment order against him, the Tenth Circuit held that
the identity of the jailer was necessary in order to establish the
sheriff’s liability.171 Lopez was unable to demonstrate that the
particular jailer to whom he had complained had in fact not been
trained or that his training had been insufficient.172 Lopez’s suit
survived, however, on his separate claim that the sheriff was
generally responsible for the conditions at the jail.173
In Section 1983 cases against government supervisors, courts
also consider the supervisors’ responses to the alleged
constitutional violations as well as similar prior incidents in
determining liability.174 Putting in place measures that are known
169

Id. at 760 (“Appellant alleges that his jailer’s acts and omissions were
the result of Sheriff LeMaster’s failure to provide adequate training and
supervision of jail personnel.”)
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 760 (10th Cir. 1999).
Appellant has presented no evidence concerning deficiencies in training
of the particular jailer involved in his case. Nor has he shown that the
county had a policy of providing its jailers with insufficient training in
the areas closely related to his ultimate injury from which we might
infer that his particular jailer’s training also was insufficient.
Id.
173
Id. at 760-62. See infra text accompanying notes 179-82.
174
Kinports, supra note 42, at 174-78. “As a general rule, the courts are
more likely to find a supervisor liable the less adequate the remedial steps she
has taken in response to prior violations.” Id. at 174.
The third factor that some courts of appeals consider in determining a
supervisor’s liability for her subordinate’s constitutional wrong is the
nature of the supervisor’s response to the particular incident that led to
the suit. Although some courts refuse to take this factor into account on
the grounds that the supervisor’s conduct subsequent to the
constitutional violation cannot in any way have contributed to it, other
courts view the supervisor’s failure to respond appropriately to the
violation as evidence that she was deliberately indifferent to it or
acquiesced in it and therefore met whatever standard of culpability the
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to be ineffective or enacting policies that are then not enforced will
not satisfy the duty of officials to prevent harm.175 Once an
awareness of a threat to inmates is established, supervising
officials have a duty to discipline subordinates who are complacent
about potential harm to inmates.176 Officials may be found
deliberately indifferent if, after a general risk to inmate safety
becomes known, they fail in their duty to prevent future assaults.177
Courts have found that plaintiffs’ claims are sufficient when they
assert that unsafe conditions at corrections facilities were caused
by supervisors’ deliberate indifference and the claims are
supported by evidence that prison officials knew of a general risk
of rape to inmates.178
court has chosen.
Id. at 177.
175
See Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 442 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (affirming liability of the director of D.C. corrections for an inmate’s
sexual harassment despite the correctional facility’s maintenance of a sexual
harassment policy because “a ‘paper’ policy cannot insulate a municipality from
liability where there is evidence . . . that the municipality was deliberately
indifferent to the policy’s violation”); Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d
1489, 1499 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the practice of not locking down
violent inmates contributed to assaults, therefore continuation of that policy
made supervisors liable).
176
Ware v. Jackson County, 150 F.3d 873, 883 (8th Cir. 1998), reh’g
denied, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22587 (holding that the facility director “knew
of allegations” of sexual abuse by corrections officers against inmates and the
“failure to discipline adequately was regarded as evidence of deliberate
indifference”).
177
Id. at 884 (holding that the jury’s finding of supervisory liability for
corrections officers’ sexual misconduct was supported by defendant director’s
failure to “order any precautionary measures to protect . . . inmates from being
further victimized”).
178
See Krein v. Norris, 309 F.3d 487, 488 (8th Cir. 2002) (claiming that
defendant was deliberately indifferent to inmate safety, plaintiff alleges liability
for “failing to provide adequate security”); Spruce v. Sargent, 149 F.3d 783, 786
(8th Cir. 1998) (upholding liability of a defendant warden when, during trial,
that warden testified that “inmates had to ‘fight’ against sexual aggressors . . . .
These statements amount to direct evidence of Warden Sargent’s knowledge of
the risk of sexual assault and/or rape in the unit”); Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of
Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 77 (6th Cir. 1995) (“The heart of plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment claim is that Warden Foltz . . . neither had a policy to identify and
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On those grounds, the Tenth Circuit recognized the claim of
Lopez against Sheriff LeMaster, even though Lopez could not
identify the guard to whom he had reported a threat of assault.179
Absent evidence to demonstrate that the sheriff’s failure to
supervise a particular jailer caused his harm, Lopez argued that the
sheriff was liable for “constitutionally infirm conditions at the jail”
that also contributed to his injuries.180 Using standards of the
Oklahoma Department of Health as “persuasive authority
concerning what is required” to ensure inmate safety, the Tenth
Circuit held that Lopez had stated a sufficient claim “that the
sheriff was aware of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate
health and safety by failing to take reasonable measures to abate
the risk.”181 The court held that prior attacks at the jail could have
put the sheriff on notice of the unsafe conditions, and an admission
by the sheriff following a suicide at the jail served as “evidence
that [the sheriff] was aware of the risk of harm to inmates resulting
from inadequate supervision, and failed to take reasonable
measures to prevent it.”182 Thus, Lopez ultimately survived the
defendant’s summary judgment motion based on the defendant’s
awareness of general conditions at his facility, rather than his
awareness of conditions of confinement specific to Lopez.
The Supreme Court held in Farmer that “a subjective approach
to deliberate indifference does not require a prisoner seeking a
remedy for unsafe conditions to await a tragic event such as an
actual assault before obtaining relief.”183 However, the Tenth
screen those potential transferees who would not be safe in the camp nor created
guidelines for prison staff to follow when screening inmates for transfer.”);
Skinner v. Uphoff, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1209 (D. Wyo. 2002) (holding
defendants liable in a class action suit where an “Eighth Amendment ‘failure to
protect’ case [arose] out of a challenge to the existing conditions at the
Wyoming State Penitentiary” at which inmate-on-inmate assaults were common
but went unaddressed).
179
Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756 (10th Cir. 1999). For the facts of this
case, see text accompanying notes 92-97.
180
Id. at 760-64 (considering “Sheriff LeMaster’s individual liability for
these conditions”).
181
Id. at 760-61 (citations omitted).
182
Id. at 762.
183
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 (1994) (internal quotations
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Circuit’s reasoning in Lopez v. LeMaster suggests that the claims
of prison rape victims will be made stronger through proof of a
general lack of safety at the facilities in which the claimants were
housed.184 In a more recent decision by the Seventh Circuit,
Riccardo v. Rausch, the court went so far as to require evidence of
general conditions in order to demonstrate an objective harm from
the likelihood that a sexual assault would occur.185 The plaintiff in
that case reported to a guard that he felt threatened by a particular
inmate with whom he was subsequently assigned to share a cell.186
The inmate brought suit against the guard, and a jury found that the
defendant knew that Riccardo faced a threat of serious harm from
the new cell assignment.187 The court reversed, holding that the
subjective prong of the Farmer standard requires a jury to consider
facility-wide data in order to reasonably find that a serious risk was
known to a defendant.188 The Seventh Circuit held that “a
omitted).
184
See also, Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76 (6th Cir. 1995)
(denying defendant corrections supervisor’s summary judgment motion because
conditions at correctional facility were enough evidence to create a question of
fact as to defendant’s deliberately indifference).
185
Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 1589 (2005). The Seventh Circuit reversed a jury award of $1.5 million to an
inmate who was sexually assaulted by a cellmate after he had reported to a guard
that he felt threatened by that cellmate.
186
Id. at 525.
187
Id. at 527.
188
Id. at 527-28.
[T]here may be other ways to show both an objectively serious risk and
the guards’ knowledge of that risk. For example, Riccardo might have
attempted to demonstrate that there is a strong correlation between
prisoners’ professions of fear and actual violence. How many murders
(or homosexual assaults) occur in [the facility where plaintiff was
incarcerated] (or the Illinois prison system) per hundred inmate-years
of custody? How many violent events were preceded by requests for
protection? How many requests for protection were dishonored, yet
nothing untoward happened? Data along these lines would have
enabled a jury (and the court) to evaluate actual risks even though
Riccardo was unable to show that [the defendant] should have deemed
[the cellmate] to present an especial risk. If violence is common at [the
prison], and inmates have good track records in identifying potential
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prisoner’s bare assertion [of a risk] is not enough to make the
guard subjectively aware of a risk, if the objective indicators do not
substantiate the inmate’s assertion.”189
C. Supervisory Liability for Deliberately Indifferent Cell
Assignments
In applying Farmer, a number of circuits have recognized that
the objective prong of the deliberate indifference standard may be
satisfied when a prisoner is housed in disregard of the threat that
the placement may pose.190 In Rhodes v. Chapman, the Supreme
Court held that, as a general practice, “double-celling” inmates
aggressors, then guards who do not have their heads in the sand must
actually (that is, subjectively) understand the risk an inmate faces when
a protest is disregarded. But if violence is rare, or if there is poor
correlation between inmates’ alarums and subsequent violence, then
Riccardo’s initial protest would not have provided [the defendant] with
actual knowledge of an impending assault. . . . [A] prisoner’s bare
assertion is not enough to make the guard subjectively aware of a risk,
if the objective indicators do not substantiate the inmate’s assertion.
Id.
189

Id. at 528.
See Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290 (6th Cir. 2004) (reversing summary
judgment because a jury could find warden liable for plaintiff’s placement in
unit with a dangerous inmate who later attacked plaintiff); Riccardo v. Rausch,
375 F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 2004) (hypothesizing liability if, on similar facts,
plaintiff had been placed in a cell with an inmate known to be a sexual
predator); Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718, 719 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing
summary judgment because a jury could find prison officials liable where the
plaintiff was “double-celled with an aggressive homosexual”); Calderon-Ortiz v.
Laboy-Alvarado, 300 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2002) (reversing the dismissal of the
plaintiff’s claim that the detention facility in which he was held “did not take
measures to separate and house inmates according to their safety needs and the
security risks they posed” and that this led to the plaintiff’s rape); Nami v.
Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1996) (reversing dismissal of plaintiff’s claim
against supervisors of juvenile detention facility where “complaint alleged that
the increase in rapes and other assaults was a result of double-celling”). See also
James v. Tilghman, 194 F.R.D. 408, 417 (D. Conn. 1999) (denying post-trial
motions on the grounds that “the jury found fault with defendants’ continued
placement of [the assailant] in a cellblock with new prison admittees, despite
strong suggestion of [the assailant’s] sexual proclivities”).
190
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does not violate the Eighth Amendment.191 In addition to decisions
that have explicitly held that double-celling resulting in rape can be
unconstitutional, circuits have broadened the holding of Rhodes so
that conditions that deprive inmates of physical safety generally
can constitute cruel and unusual punishment.192
In 1996, the Third Circuit interpreted the Rhodes holding in
Nami v. Fauver, a case brought by prisoners at a youth detention
center against the commissioner of the New Jersey Department of
Corrections and other correctional officials.193 The plaintiffs sued
under Section 1983, claiming cruel and unusual punishment due to
their confinement in double-celled units.194 Included was the
allegation that “[d]ouble-celling has resulted in rapes and other
assaults, as well as psychological stress.”195 The district court had
considered these allegations, but had dismissed the case, “finding
that the claim based on these allegations lacked merit because the
plaintiffs failed to show deliberate indifference.”196 In reversing
the lower court’s decision, the Third Circuit held that if the
defendants were on notice that rapes had occurred at the facility
and knew that double-celling contributed to that occurrence, a jury
could find that “all officials were deliberately indifferent to the
possibility that the conditions under which they housed the
plaintiffs significantly increased the possibility of such well-known
harms as prison rape.”197
The Sixth Circuit has twice held, in cases involving transsexual
191

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
Barrett, Note, supra note 24, at 412-13, 422 (discussing the adoption of
a “core conditions” standard for assessing the constitutionality of prison
conditions and finding that the Eighth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit and the Second
Circuit, have each adopted a test whereby double-celling could be a deprivation
of physical safety on specific facts, and thus violate the Eighth Amendment
under Rhodes).
193
Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996).
194
Id.
195
Id. at 65-66.
196
Id. at 66 (internal quotations omitted).
197
Id. at 68. The Court held that notice could be established through letters
that the plaintiffs claimed to have written to the defendants. Id. at 67. This was
an appeal of a motion to dismiss, so no substantial record existed for the basis of
this decision.
192
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prisoners as plaintiffs, that supervisors may be held liable when
prisoners’ placements leave them vulnerable to assault.198 Taylor v.
Michigan Department of Corrections came before the Sixth Circuit
on an appeal of the defendant’s qualified immunity from suit prior
to the Farmer decision.199 In 1995, the plaintiff appealed a second
summary judgment order on the issue of whether the defendant
warden could be held liable for a subordinate’s deliberate
indifference in transferring the plaintiff-prisoner to a facility that
“posed a substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners like
plaintiff.”200 The Sixth Circuit held that the warden could be found
liable for “abandoning the specific duties of his position—–
adopting and implementing an operating procedure that would
require a review of the inmate’s files before authorizing the
transfers—in the face of actual knowledge of a breakdown in the
proper workings of the department.”201 More recently, in Greene v.
Bowles, the Sixth Circuit held that a prison warden could be liable
for assaults on a vulnerable prisoner by a predatory inmate who
had been placed in the same unit.202
Just as the Sixth Circuit found a viable claim in Taylor for a
supervisor’s failure to implement “an operating procedure” that
could have prevented an inmate’s sexual assault, so too has the
First Circuit held supervisors liable for the failure of classification
198

Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 293-94 (6th Cir. 2004) (reversing
summary judgment and holding that defendant Warden Brigano could be held
liable for an attack on the plaintiff because Greene’s placement in protective
custody “without segregation or protective measures presented a substantial risk
to her safety of which Warden Brigano was aware”); Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of
Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 77 (6th Cir. 1995) (reversing summary judgment and holding
that defendant-warden could be liable for “disregard[ing] a risk of harm of
which he was aware—by failing to adopt reasonable policies to protect inmates
like Taylor”).
199
Taylor, 69 F.3d at 78-79.
200
Id. at 77.
201
Id. at 81. The Court went on to hold that “[a] jury could find on the facts
that Foltz personally had a job to do, and that he did not do it.” Id. at 81.
202
Greene, 361 F.3d at 293-94 (holding that “Greene has raised an issue of
fact as to Warden Brigano’s knowledge of a risk to her safety because of her
status as a vulnerable inmate and because of Frezzell’s status as a predatory
inmate”).
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and placement systems at their facilities.203 The plaintiff in
Calderon-Ortiz v. Laboy appealed to the First Circuit when the
district court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim against supervisors at a
pretrial detention facility for their “failure to afford adequate
protection to inmates from attack by other inmates.”204 Applying
Farmer, the First Circuit held that the supervisors as well as the
guards at the facility “could have inferred that Calderon was at risk
of being sexually assaulted” based on a general risk to inmates
allegedly caused by the defendants’ “practice of not enforcing
policies of the [Corrections Administration] to ensure that weak,
vulnerable inmates are housed separately from stronger, dangerous
inmates.”205
Most recently, in 2003, the Ninth Circuit held that, in
challenging his double-celled housing arrangement with a
“sexually aggressive cellmate,” a prisoner-plaintiff had asserted a
claim of deliberate indifference sufficient to survive the
defendants’ summary judgment motion.206 The notice to the
defendants in that case came from the prison’s computer records,
which indicated that the plaintiff’s cellmate had a history of
assaults and rape.207 Existence of those computer records was
203

Compare Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 81 (6th Cir. 1995)
(holding defendant liable for “abandoning the specific duties of his position—–
adopting and implementing an operating procedure that would require a review
of the inmate’s files before authorizing the transfers . . . .”), with Calderon-Ortiz
v. Laboy-Alvarado, 300 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2002) (reversing dismissal of
plaintiff’s claim that his sodomy while imprisoned was the result of the
institution “not tak[ing] measures to separate and house inmates according to
their safety needs and the security risks they posed”).
204
Calderon-Ortiz v. Laboy-Alvarado, 300 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2002). The
plaintiff brought his claim under the Fifth Amendment because he challenged
the conditions of his confinement as a pre-trial detainee (on charges later
dismissed) on due process grounds. The Court of Appeals faulted the district
court for not applying the Farmer deliberate indifference standard and used that
standard in its de novo review of the case. Id. at 62-64.
205
Id. at 66.
206
Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718, 719 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing
summary judgment where defendants were granted qualified immunity because
“a reasonable prison official could have believed the [plaintiff’s] double-celling
arrangement was lawful”).
207
Id. at 719 (“The computer records indicate that the cellmate had anally
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sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether prison
officials were deliberately indifferent in double-celling the
inmate.208 Evidence such as this will become more available to
prisoner-plaintiffs because of the Prison Rape Elimination Act.209
The facts of this Ninth Circuit case are considered below, in light
of changes in prison administration that could be effected by this
recent legislation.
III. THE PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT OF 2003
The Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA) was passed
unanimously by both houses of Congress and was signed into law
by President George W. Bush on September 4, 2003.210 The
findings included in the Act underscore the ways in which
allowing sexual assaults in prisons contradicts the goal of
imprisonment—whether that goal is viewed as incapacitation,211
rehabilitation,212 deterrence213 or retribution.214 The PREA
raped a sixteen year-old boy, and showed his assaults on other inmates, and a
threat to rape another inmate.”).
208
Id. (“Even assuming the officers in question knew only about Durrell’s
cellmate, there was sufficient information from which a jury could find
‘deliberate indifference.’”).
209
42 U.S.C. § 15603 (2005). Pursuant to the Act, the Bureau of Justice
Statistics planned to collect administrative records from 3,269 facilities in 2004.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DATA COLLECTIONS
FOR THE PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT OF 2003 1 (2004) [hereinafter BJS
REPORT].
210
Julie Samia Mair et al., National Challenges in Population Health: New
Hope for Victims of Prison Sexual Assault, 31 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 602, 602
(2003) (describing the PREA and reviewing some of the prior literature
concerning prison rape).
211
Incapacitation is a justification of prison premised on the notion that
removing law-breakers from free society will prevent them from committing
further criminal acts. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 15601(10) (2005) (finding that “[p]rison
rape increases the level of homicides and other violence against inmates and
staff, and the risk of insurrections and riots”).
212
The penological theory of rehabilitation is that criminal offenders can be
more sociable following imprisonment. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 15601(1) (2005)
(finding that “[v]ictims of prison rape suffer severe physical and psychological
effects that hinder their ability to integrate into the community and maintain

RIES MACROED CORRECTED 053105.DOC

THE PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT

6/6/2005 1:43 PM

959

promises to make prison officials more accountable for the rapes
that occur in prisons215 by requiring them to maintain better
internal records on the occurrence of rape in their facilities216 and
by urging the creation of standards for improving the management
of prisons in which rapes occur.217 The PREA affords executive
bodies at the federal and state levels discretion to implement
preventive programs.218 Congress was specific, however, about
stable employment upon their release from prison”); 42 U.S.C. § 15601(6)
(2005) (finding that “[p]rison rape often goes unreported, and inmate victims
often receive inadequate treatment for the severe physical and psychological
effects of sexual assault - if they receive treatment at all”).
213
Deterrence is a justification for imposing imprisonment on even nonviolent criminal offenders so that they and others will abide by the law to avoid
being imprisoned in the future. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 15601(8) (2005) (finding that
“[p]rison rape endangers the public safety by making brutalized inmates more
likely to commit crimes when they are released – as 600,000 inmates are each
year”).
214
The penological justification of retribution does not look forward to
possibilities of future lawbreaking, but instead views imprisonment as the
penalty for crimes against victims or against society, or both. Cf. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (holding that “[b]eing violently assaulted in
prison is simply not ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their
offenses against society’”) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347
(1981). For an example of an inmate whose prison experience exceeded the
punishment for his victimless crimes, see Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 353
(3d Cir. 1991) (prisoner convicted for using $42 of counterfeit money sued after
he was forced to perform oral sex in prison and also tested positive for HIV
while in prison).
215
42 U.S.C. § 15602(6) (2005) (stating that one purpose of the Act is to
“increase the accountability of prison officials who fail to detect, prevent,
reduce, and punish prison rape”).
216
Pursuant to the PREA, the Bureau of Justice Statistics shall carry out
“each calendar year, a comprehensive statistical review and analysis of the
incidence and effects of prison rape,” id. § 15603(a), and the PREA will also
result in national standards relating to “data collection and reporting.” Id. §
15606(e)(2)(L).
217
Id. § 15606 (establishing the National Prison Rape Elimination
Commission to investigate and then recommend national standards for reducing
rape in prisons.).
218
See supra note 24 (quoting authors who are concerned that the ultimate
utility of the PREA in addressing the problem of prison rape is contingent on the
accuracy of the data it collects and the implementation of its standards in state

RIES MACROED CORRECTED 053105.DOC

960

6/6/2005 1:43 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

methods it expected prisons to employ.219
A. The Legislation and Its Implementation
The findings included in the PREA220 indicate that Congress
was concerned about the victims of prison rape221 and the effects
of prison sexual assault that extend to the communities to which
prisoners return.222 The PREA requires the U.S. Department of
and federal prisons).
219
42 U.S.C. § 15606(e) (specifying the “[m]atters [to be] included” in the
National Prison Rape Reduction Commission’s recommendations for national
standards to reduce rape in prisons.).
220
Id. § 15601 (2005) (“Congress makes the following findings . . . .”).
221
Congress was concerned for the victims of prison rape particularly
because the victims are often young offenders serving sentences for first-time or
non-violent offenses. Id. § 15601(4) (2005) “Young first-time offenders are at
increased risk of sexual victimization. Juveniles are 5 times more likely to be
sexually assaulted in adult rather than juvenile facilities—often within the first
48 hours of incarceration.” Id.
[P]rison rape occurs every day. For example, just last month, a 19-year
old college student in Florida, in jail on marijuana charges, was raped
by a cell mate who was being held on charges of sexual battery. This
rape occurred within hours of the student being placed in his cell.
149 CONG. REC. H7764 (daily ed. July 25, 2003) (statement of Rep. Frank
Wolf). For an example of a first-time nonviolent offender being raped in prison,
see Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 353 (3d Cir. 1991) (prisoner convicted on
counterfeiting charges for passing $42 in fake bills, sexually assaulted). See also
WILBERT RIDEAU & RON WILKBERG, LIFE SENTENCES: RAGE AND SURVIVAL
BEHIND BARS 91-92 (1992) (excerpting ANTHONY M. SCACCO, JR., RAPE IN
PRISON (1975) and providing Dr. Scacco’s description of the victimization of
William Laite, a former Georgia legislator who was convicted of perjury and
sentenced to jail in Terrant County, Texas).
222
The findings in the statute state that inmates who are either victims of
sexual assault or perpetrators of sexual assault are more likely to be released
with sexually-transmitted diseases. 42 U.S.C. § 15601(7) (2005) (“Prison rape
undermines the public health by contributing to the spread of [HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, and hepatitis B and C] diseases, and often giving a potential death
sentence to its victims.”). In 2002, the year prior to the PREA’s passage, the rate
of AIDS cases in prison was three and a half times higher than outside prison.
LAURA MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HIV IN PRISONS, 2002 5 (2004)
[hereinafter HIV IN PRISONS 2002], available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
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Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics to collect and analyze data on
the incidence of sexual assaults in federal, state, and local
correctional facilities.223 The Act also establishes a new
congressional commission—the National Prison Rape Elimination
Commission (Commission)—to study the occurrence of sexual
assaults in prisons, to evaluate the responses of prison officials to
these assaults, and to make recommendations for national
standards for prison safety.224 With “due consideration” of the
Commission’s recommendations, the Attorney General will issue a
final rule with “national standards for the detection, prevention,
reduction, and punishment of prison rape.”225 The PREA also
provides for training and education programs for corrections
officials226 as well as grants to state prison systems to further

gov/bjs/pub/pdf/hivpj02.pdf (last visited April 4, 2005). The findings also state
that because of the prevalence of rape in prison, prisoners are more likely to
commit further crimes when they are returned to communities. 42 U.S.C. §
15601(8) (2005) (“Prison rape endangers the public safety by making brutalized
inmates more likely to commit crimes when they are released—as 600,000
inmates are each year.”). “Inmates, often non-violent first-time offenders, come
out of a prison rape experience . . . far more likely to commit violent crimes than
when they entered.” 149 CONG. REC. H7764 (daily ed. July 25, 2003) (statement
of Rep. Robert Scott).
223
BJS REPORT, supra note 209, at 1.
224
42 U.S.C. § 15606 (2005). “There is established a commission to be
known as the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission.” Id.
225
Id. § 15607.
Not later than 1 year after receiving the [Commission’s] report . . . the
Attorney General shall publish a final rule adopting national standards
for the detection, prevention, reduction, and punishment of prison rape.
. . . [B]ased upon the independent judgment of the Attorney General,
after giving due consideration to the recommended national standards
provided by the Commission . . . and being informed by such data,
opinions, and proposals that the Attorney General determines to be
appropriate to consider.
Id.
226
Id. § 15604. “The National Institute of Corrections shall conduct
periodic training and education programs for Federal, State, and local authorities
responsible for the prevention, investigation, and punishment of instances of
prison rape.” Id.
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prevention and prosecution of inmate-on-inmate rape.227
The Attorney General’s standards will be immediately
applicable to the Federal Bureau of Prisons.228 States that receive a
certification of compliance with the national standards are eligible
for grant money provided for by the Act.229 Going forward, the
Attorney General will annually publish a report on grantee states
that are not compliant with the standards.230 Noncompliance will
be punished by a five percent reduction in federal funding to a
state’s prison system, although states can avoid this penalty by
committing the same five percent of funding toward measures that
will bring the prisons into compliance with the standards in future
years.231
227

Id. § 15605.
[T]he Attorney General shall make grants to States to assist those States
in ensuring that budgetary circumstances (such as reduced State and
local spending on prisons) do not compromise efforts to protect inmates
(particularly from prison rape) and to safeguard the communities to
which inmates return. The purpose of grants under this section shall be
to provide funds for personnel, training, technical assistance, data
collection, and equipment to prevent and prosecute prisoner rape.
Id.
228

Id. § 15607(b). “The national standards . . . shall apply to the Federal
Bureau of Prisons immediately upon adoption of the final rule.” Id.
229
Id. § 15605(d)(2) (2005). “Each [grant] application . . . shall — (A)
include the certification of the chief executive that the State receiving such grant
— (i) has adopted all national prison rape standards that, as of the date on which
the application was submitted, have been promulgated under this Act . . . .” Id.
230
Id. § 15607(c)(3). “Not later than September 30 of each year, the
Attorney General shall publish a report listing each grantee that is not in
compliance with the national standards.” Id.
231
Id. § 15605(c)(2).
For each fiscal year, any amount that a State would otherwise receive
for prison purposes for that fiscal year under a grant program covered
by this subsection shall be reduced by 5 percent, unless the chief
executive of the State submits to the Attorney General — (A) a
certification that the State has adopted, and is in full compliance with,
the national standards . . . or (B) an assurance that not less than 5
percent of such amount shall be used only for the purpose of enabling
the State to adopt, and achieve full compliance with, those national
standards . . . .
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Data collection under the PREA is scheduled to begin in 2006,
and a report analyzing those findings will be written in 2007.232 In
developing the methodology for this data collection, the Bureau of
Justice Statistics has adopted definitions of sexual violence used by
the Centers for Disease Control that encompass both completed
and attempted nonconsensual acts.233 These definitions reflect the
recommendations of experienced prison rape researchers familiar
with the inconsistent data that has resulted from studies that relied
on self-reporting by inmates to document the occurrence of rape.234
The divergent results have in part been a result of the inconsistent
definitions of sexually assaultive conduct used in surveying
prisoners.235 Recognizing these limitations, the PREA supplies
definitions of rape that go beyond forcible penetration.236
The PREA also established a “Review Panel on Prison Rape,”
which will hold annual hearings on the results of the data
collections.237 The National Prison Rape Elimination Commission
Id.
232

BJS REPORT, supra note 209, at 6.
Allen Beck et al., Implementing the 2003 Prison Rape Elimination Act
in Juvenile Residential Facilities, 66 CORRECTIONS TODAY 26 (2004).
234
BJS REPORT, supra note 209, at 2.
235
NO ESCAPE, supra note 9, at 138. “Many of the studies that found lower
rates of abuse either expressly counted only incidents involving the use of
physical force, or did so by implication by leaving the term ‘rape’ undefined.”
Id.
236
42 U.S.C. § 15609(9) (2005).
The term “rape” means — (A) the carnal knowledge, oral sodomy,
sexual assault with an object, or sexual fondling of a person, forcibly or
against that person’s will; (B) the carnal knowledge, oral sodomy,
sexual assault with an object, or sexual fondling of a person not
forcibly or against the person’s will, where the victim is incapable of
giving consent because of his or her youth or his or her temporary or
permanent mental or physical incapacity; or (C) the carnal knowledge,
oral sodomy, sexual assault with an object, or sexual fondling of a
person achieved through the exploitation of the fear or threat of
physical violence or bodily injury.
Id.
237
Id. § 15603(b)(3).
The duty of the Panel shall be to carry out, for each calendar year,
public hearings concerning the operation of the three prisons with the
233
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also will hold hearings as it compiles its findings and formulates
recommended standards.238 Under the Act’s provisions, the
Attorney General must publish a final rule with the national
standards one year after the issuance of the Commission’s
report.239 Ninety days after the Attorney General’s standards are
released, those standards will be delivered to state heads of
corrections departments.240 Adoption of the standards by prison

highest incidence of prison rape and the two prisons with the lowest
incidence of prison rape in each [sample] category of facilities . . . The
Panel shall hold a separate hearing regarding the three Federal or State
prisons with the highest incidence of prison rape. The purpose of these
hearings shall be to collect evidence to aid in the identification of
common characteristics of both victims and perpetrators of prison rape,
and the identification of common characteristics of prisons and prison
systems with a high incidence of prison rape, and the identification of
common characteristics of prisons and prison systems that appear to
have been successful in deterring prison rape.
Id.
238

Id. § 15606(g). At the time of this writing, the membership of the
commission is comprised of: Honorable Reggie B. Walton of the D.C. District
Court, chair; James Evan Aiken, Jamie Fellner of Human Rights Watch; Nicole
Stelle Garnett of University of Notre Dame Law School; John A. Kaneb of H.P.
Hood, Inc.; Pat Nolan of Justice Fellowship; Gustavus Adolphus Puryear IV of
Corrections Corporation of America; Brenda Smith of the Washington College
of Law at American University; and Cindy Struckman-Johnson of the University
of South Dakota. This list is available at the National Institute of Corrections’
website,
at
http://www.nicic.org/Downloads/PDF/misc/prea_commission_
members.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
239
42 U.S.C. § 15607(a)(1) (2005). “Not later than 1 year after receiving
the [Commission’s] report . . . the Attorney General shall publish a final rule
adopting national standards for the detection, prevention, reduction, and
punishment of prison rape.” Id.
240
Id. § 15607(a)(4).
Within 90 days of publishing the final rule . . . the Attorney General
shall transmit the national standards adopted under such paragraph to
the chief executive of each State, the head of the department of
corrections of each State, and to the appropriate authorities in those
units of local government who oversee operations in one or more
prisons.
Id.
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accreditation organizations also will follow in the same year.241
B. National Standards for Addressing Rape in Prisons
Congress set forth with extraordinary detail the matters that the
National Prison Rape Elimination Commission is required to
consider for recommendation as national standards.242 Thus, the
precise subjects of the Commission’s recommendations can be
anticipated. Since the passage of the PREA, the American
Correctional Association (ACA) has released its own
recommendations to correctional agencies243 and, in accordance
with the PREA, the Commission will consider these standards in
producing its report.244 The PREA limits the Attorney General’s
discretion in issuing standards by requiring that the final rule not
“impose substantial additional costs” on state prison systems.245
Some of the methods outlined by Congress, to establish a
preventive approach to rape without substantial costs, are detailed

241

Id. § 15608(b)(2).
Id. § 15606(e) (detailing the matters to be included in “recommended
national standards for enhancing the detection, prevention, reduction, and
punishment of prison rape”).
243
ACA Policies and Resolutions, 66 CORRECTIONS TODAY 68 (October
2004) [hereinafter ACA Policy].
244
42 U.S.C. § 15606(f) (2005).
In developing recommended national standards for enhancing the
detection, prevention, reduction, and punishment of prison rape, the
Commission shall consider any standards that have already been
developed, or are being developed simultaneously to the deliberations
of the Commission. The Commission shall consult with accreditation
organizations responsible for the accreditation of Federal, State, local
or private prisons, that have developed or are currently developing
standards related to prison rape. The Commission will also consult with
national associations representing the corrections profession that have
developed or are currently developing standards related to prison rape.
Id.
245
Id. § 15607(a)(3). “The Attorney General shall not establish a national
standard under this section that would impose substantial additional costs
compared to the costs presently expended by Federal, State, and local prison
authorities.” Id.
242
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below.246
Perhaps the most effective means by which prison officials can
reduce sexual assaults is to more carefully classify inmates for
housing within facilities.247 This matter was cited by Congress as
one that the Commission is charged to investigate.248 There are a
number of inmate characteristics that wardens and guards could
recognize as making inmates more susceptible to sexual assault.249
246

This note does not consider the extent to which funds could be allocated
towards policies focused on the perpetrators of assaults. One method for
addressing prison rapists is through criminal prosecutions for sexual assaults that
occur within prisons. Id. § 15604 (2005) (stating that “[t]he National Institute of
Corrections shall conduct training and education programs for . . . punishment of
instances of prison rape”) (emphasis added); see also NO ESCAPE, supra note 9,
at 235, 241. Human Rights Watch published a Federal Bureau of Prisons
Program Statement entitled Sexual Abuse/Assault Prevention and Intervention
Programs that includes a description of each prison supervisor’s “responsibility
to ensure that the incident [of sexual assault] is referred to the appropriate law
enforcement agency having jurisdiction.” Id. The private industry surrounding
corrections has already begun to identify ways that states can spend grant money
under the PREA on controlling inmates known to be threats of sexual assault.
States Slow to Design, Implement Changes after Passage of Rape Bill: Budget
Constraints, Even with Assistance, Slows Process, 9 CORRECTIONS PROF. 11
(2004). Alanco Technologies Inc., a company that sells tracking devices, is
marketing a new line of their product as a way for corrections officials to track
the movements of known sexual predators within their facility. Security Firms
Expect New Prison Law to Boost Product Sales, 9 CORRECTIONS PROF. 11
(2004). Tracking devices are already being used in Ohio’s state prisons.
Editorial, No Excuse for Abuse; State Takes Necessary Action to Stop Sexual
Attacks in Prisons, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Mar. 13, 2004, at 12A.
247
JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, CRITICAL ISSUES
AND DEVELOPMENTS IN PRISON CLASSIFICATION 1 (2001) (“Traditional inmate
classification systems have been narrowly focused on determining the custody
level of inmate. . . . Very little attention has been drawn to how an inmate should
be housed and programmed once the prisoner arrives at the facility.”).
248
42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2) (2005). The Commission’s report on national
standards “shall include recommended national standards relating to— (A) the
classification and assignment of prisoners, using proven standardized
instruments and protocols, in a manner that limits the occurrence of prison rape”
Id.
249
NO ESCAPE, supra note 9, at 63.
Specifically, prisoners fitting any part of the following description are
more likely to targeted: young, small in size, physically weak, white,
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Young or slim prisoners—whether homosexual or heterosexual—
face a greater risk of sexual assault in prison.250 Identifiable
homosexuals and white inmates are also disproportionately
targeted.251 It is indeed possible to protect vulnerable inmates; for
example, San Francisco has implemented rape-prevention
protocols within its jail whereby officials identify potential victims
and segregate them from potential predators.252
The identification of prisoners with a heightened risk of
committing rape or being victimized by sexual assault is not one of
the practices recommended by the American Correctional
Association (ACA).253 Policies that would identify such prisoners
were, however, among those previously recognized by the
organization’s Standards Committee and were presented to
Congress upon its consideration of the PREA.254 The low cost of
gay, first offender, possessing “feminine” characteristics such as long
hair or a high voice; being unassertive, unaggressive, shy, intellectual,
not street-smart, or “passive”; or having been convicted of a sexual
offense against a minor. Prisoners with any one of these characteristics
typically face an increased risk of sexual abuse, while prisoners with
several overlapping characteristics are much more likely that other
prisoners to be targeted for abuse.
Id.
250

Josh Getlin, ‘I’m Still Fighting’; He Suffered the Devastation of
Jailhouse Gang Rape. Now, Stephen Donaldson Resolves to Stop a Crime that
Others Would Rather Keep Quiet, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1994, at E1.
251
NO ESCAPE, supra note 9, at 70-73.
252
Lehrer, supra note 9, at 10.
253
ACA Policy, supra note 243.
254
Prison Rape Reduction: Hearing on H.R. 1707 Before the House
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec., House Judiciary Comm.,
108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Charles J. Kehoe, President, American
Correctional Association), available at 2003 WL 11717551. Charles Kehoe
gave testimony that
ACA’s Standards Committee, in January 2003, finalized the adoption
of several specific standards that are intended to significantly impact
sexual misconduct and prison rape. Working closely within and outside
the corrections profession, the Standards Committee adopted standards:
I. to revise the intake screening requirements for all offenders to
specifically identify those who are vulnerable or have tendencies to act
out with sexually aggressive behavior; . . . III. to require that offenders
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this type of policy in relation to its potential effectiveness in
reducing rape among cellmates necessitates strong consideration of
this practice from the National Prison Rape Elimination
Commission.255 Prison segregation policies have been challenged
in the past, notably by inmates with HIV, on the grounds that while
placed in segregated housing, prisoners are denied privileges
granted to other inmates.256 These challenges have been
unsuccessful,257 and presumably, segregating vulnerable and
predatory inmates also would be deemed constitutionally sound.258
with history of sexually assaultive behavior are. . . identified, monitored
and counseled; and, IV. to require that offenders at risk for
victimization are identified, monitored and counseled.
Id. (emphasis added).
255
42 U.S.C. § 15607(a)(3) (2005) (“The Attorney General shall not
establish a national standard . . . that would impose substantial additional costs .
. . . “); AUSTIN, supra note 247, at 1 (“The most dramatic impact of objective
classifications systems has been the economic benefits reaped from our ability to
place larger proportions of the inmate in lower custody levels without
jeopardizing inmate, staff, or public safety.”); NO ESCAPE, supra note 9, at 14647 (describing the implementation in North Carolina of a pilot program whereby
prisoners were classified by their risk of being a perpetrator or victim of rape
and this classification was considered in their housing assignments); Scott
Canon, Progress Lags Despite New Legislation to Stop Prison Rape, KAN. CITY
STAR, Mar. 22, 2004, at 1 (describing “a more careful sorting of predator from
prey” as a “relatively inexpensive” method of preventing sexual assaults in
prison).
256
Jin Hee Lee, Excerpts from a Jailhouse Lawyer’s Manual, Fifth Edition:
Chapter 22: AIDS in Prison, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 355, 378-80, 38386 (2000) [hereinafter Jailhouse Lawyers’ Manual AIDS].
257
Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 1999) (affirming
dismissal of claims that “HIV-positive inmates are unable to participate in many
programs and activities with the HIV-negative, general population”).
258
A Supreme Court decision this term regarding segregation of prisoners
by race will affect only inmate classifications that are based on race. Johnson v.
California, 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005). The Court held that strict scrutiny should be
applied to the California Department of Corrections’ policy of double-celling
inmates according to racial classifications, to prevent violence by “racial gangs.”
Id. at 1144. In reaching its decision, the Court maintained that the deferential
standards of review of prison regulations established in Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78 (1987), continues to be applicable to other sorts of classifications.
Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1149. The Court held “[w]e have never applied Turner to
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The Commission also will recommend standards for the
implementation of a “system for reporting incidents” of rape in
prisons.259 The ACA recommends that facilities “[f]oster an
environment in which the reporting of sexual assaults behavior is
encouraged and reports may be made without fear of reprisal.”260
For example, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction has responded to the passage of the PREA with plans to
establish confidential means by which inmates may report assaults
or threats, possibly through the use of a free phone line.261 The
Bureau of Justice Statistics’s data collection will create a model of
one method by which prisons may solicit reports of assault
privately and confidentially. The Bureau is developing Audio
Computer-Assisted Self-Interviews, which are computer
questionnaires that encourage inmates to report victimization by
neither requiring that reports be made in writing nor requiring
revelations to prison staff.262 Although studies of the effectiveness
of this method are to be conducted in only a small number of
prisons, if effective, these computer systems may provide a means
for inmates to file confidential grievances.
Another matter for consideration requested by Congress is for
improved training of corrections staff.263 The ACA recommended
that prisons provide training to staff and inmates on how prisoners
can protect themselves against assault.264 Training of this kind is
racial classifications. . . . [W]e have applied Turner’s reasonable-relationship
test only to rights that are inconsistent with proper incarceration.” Id. at 1149.
259
42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(K) (2005). The Commission shall recommend
standards relating to “creating a system for reporting incidents of prison rape
that will ensure the confidentiality of prison rape complaints, protect inmates
who make prison rape complaints from retaliation, and assure the impartial
resolution of prison rape complaints.” Id.
260
ACA Policy, supra note 243, at 70.
261
Alan Johnson, Inmate-Staff Relationships: Efforts Under Way to End
Illegal Sex, Prison Chief Says, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 18, 2004, at 3B.
262
BJS REPORT, supra note 209, at 2.
263
42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(H) (2005). The Commission shall recommend
standards for “the training of correctional staff sufficient to ensure that they
understand and appreciate the significance of prison rape and the necessity of its
eradication.” Id.
264
ACA Policy, supra note 243, at 70.
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currently being developed by the National Institute of
Corrections.265 The PREA requires the National Institute of
Corrections to make “periodic” training and education available to
“Federal, State and local authorities.”266
The PREA also calls for the Commission to recommend
improved follow-up procedures for prisons to undertake in
response to incidents of rape, including “the preservation of
physical and testimonial evidence,” “physical examination and
treatment,” and “medical testing measures for reducing the
incidence of HIV transmission due to prison rape.”267 These
measures might raise privacy concerns for prison rape victims,
particularly those who contract HIV from a sexual assault;268
however, courts have given prisons wide discretion in testing
prisoners for HIV.269 If a prison pursues medical testing “for
reducing the incidence of HIV transmission due to prison rape,”270
265

NIC Offers Training on Prison Rape Legislation, 10 CORRECTIONS
PROFESSIONAL 3 (Oct. 8, 2004).
266
42 U.S.C. § 15604 (2005) (“The National Institute of Corrections shall
conduct periodic training and education programs for Federal, State, and local
authorities responsible for the prevention, investigation, and punishment of
instances of prison rape.”). Ohio has begun conducting these trainings for its
prison staff, as well as offer orientations on prison rape to its inmates. Editorial,
No Excuse for Abuse; State Takes Necessary Action to Stop Sexual Attacks in
Prisons, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 13, 2004, at 12A.
267
42 U.S.C. §§ 15606(e)(2)(C), 15606(e)(2)(F) (2005).
268
For discussion of testing and segregation of inmates with HIV and legal
claims that those practices raise, see Kathleen Knepper, Responsibility of
Correctional Officials in Responding to the Incidence of the HIV Virus in Jails
and Prisons, 21 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 45 (1995). A study
in New York State’s prisons justified mandatory HIV testing because it
“revealed that many inmates did not accept voluntary testing because they
denied or underestimated the seriousness of their risk factors.” THEODORE
HAMMETT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC HEALTH/CORRECTIONS
COLLABORATIONS: PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OF HIV/AIDS, STDS, AND TB
1 (July 1998), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/169590.pdf.
269
Jailhouse Lawyer’s Manual AIDS, supra note 256, at 372-75
(discussing prisoner challenges to involuntary HIV-testing programs). Id. at
377-80 (discussing privacy claims brought by HIV-positive inmates).
270
42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(F) (2005). The Commission shall recommend
national standards relating to “educational and medical testing measures for
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as the PREA states, the prison’s interest will outweigh prisoners’
own personal rights.271 The Commission therefore might
recommend that prison medical facilities perform thorough
examinations and testing of prison rape victims, both immediately
following a sexual assault and weeks or months afterward.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Attorney General’s final rule adopting national standards
pursuant to the PREA will be published by 2008.272 Federal courts
reducing the incidence of HIV transmission due to prison rape.” Id.
271
A Fourth Amendment challenge was made on the grounds that HIV
testing was an illegal search, in a Tenth Circuit case, Dunn v. White. 880 F.2d
1188 (10th Cir. 1989). The prison’s interest in providing treatment for HIV
outweighed the prisoners’ expectation of privacy and the search was held to be
constitutional. Id. at 1193-94. Comparing AIDS tests to drug tests the Tenth
Circuit held that “[i]n light of the seriousness of the [AIDS] disease and its
transmissibility, we conclude that the prison has a substantial interest in
pursuing a program to treat those infected with the disease. . . . The alleged lack
of a current medical response to the problem does not mandate this court’s
forbidding prison officials from continuing to collect information on the spread
of AIDS within prison walls.” Id. at 1196. Courts have likewise not shown
concern for the violation of a constitutional right to privacy when the results of
HIV tests became known to other prisoners by disclosure from prison staff.
Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 1995). In considering a defendant’s
qualified immunity from suit, the Seventh Circuit considered “whether a
prisoner has a constitutionally protected right to the concealment of his HIVpositive status from prison staff. We doubt that he has such a right; we are sure
that right was not clearly established in 1992.” Id. at 526. Likewise, disclosure
of a prisoner’s HIV-positive status is not a valid claim for relief when the
disclosure comes from the segregation of HIV-positive inmates. Tokar v.
Armontrout, 97 F.3d 1078 (8th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment against
plaintiff, an HIV-positive inmate who challenged his segregation).
272
42 U.S.C. § 15606(d)(3)(A) (2005).
Not later than 2 years after the date of the initial meeting of the
Commission, the Commission shall submit a report on the study carried
out under this subsection to— (i) the President; (ii) the Congress; (iii)
the Attorney General; (iv) the Secretary of Health and Human Services;
(v) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons; (vi) the chief
executive of each State; and (vii) the head of the department of
corrections of each State.
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should be secure in finding deliberate indifference on the part of
prison custodians if rape persists in correctional facilities beyond
that time.273 The PREA expresses Congress’s intent to “increase
accountability of prison officials who fail to detect, prevent, reduce
and punish rape”274 and to protect inmates’ Eighth Amendment
rights.275 Prison administrators should be considered on notice that
Congress expects them to “make the prevention of prison rape a
top priority”276 by “establish[ing] a zero-tolerance standard for the
incidence of prison rape.”277 As greater knowledge regarding the
prevention of prison rape becomes available throughout the U.S.
correctional system, indifference will be the only explanation
prisons officials have for not taking effective steps to prevent
sexual assaults in the facilities they supervise.
Two lawsuits currently pending in the federal courts provide a
lens through which to view the potential impact of the PREA on
the outcome of prisoners’ rights cases.278 The implementation of
the PREA will provide inmates who are vulnerable to rape with
better records of the harms suffered by victims of sexual
Id. The Attorney General’s final rule will be issued the following year. 42
U.S.C. § 15607(a)(1) (2005) (“Not later than 1 year after receiving the
[Commission’s] report . . . the Attorney General shall publish a final rule
adopting national standards for the detection, prevention, reduction, and
punishment of prison rape.”). The National Prison Rape Elimination
Commission met on March 31, 2005. Expert Panel Addresses Prison Sexual
Assaults, SOUTH BEND TRIBUNE (Indiana), Mar. 25, 2004, at B2 (reporting on a
meeting of the Commission held at Notre Dame University).
273
One stated purpose of the PREA is to “make the prevention of prison
rape a top priority in each prison system.” 42 U.S.C. § 15602(2) (2005).
274
Id. § 15602(6). “The purposes of this Act are to . . . (6) increase the
accountability of prison officials who fail to detect, prevent, reduce, and punish
prison rape.” Id.
275
Id. § 15602(7). “The purposes of this Act are to . . . (7) protect the
Eighth Amendment rights of Federal, State, and local prisoners.” Id.
276
Id. § 15602(2). “The purposes of this Act are to . . . (2) make the
prevention of prison rape a top priority in each prison system.” Id.
277
Id. § 15602(1). “The purposes of this Act are to . . . (1) establish a zerotolerance standard for the incidence of prison rape in prisons in the United
States.” Id.
278
Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718 (9th Cir. 2003); Brown v. Scott, 329
F. Supp. 2d 905 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
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assaults,279 and with more effective administrative processes for
reporting threats.280 Thus, for victims of preventable prison rapes,
deliberate indifference of supervisors will be easier to establish in
civil suits, despite the traditional deference granted to prison
managers by courts.281 Finally, the PREA and the standards that it
will generate should enable plaintiffs to win meaningful remedies
that will serve to prevent prison rape in the future.282
A. Two Current Litigants: Paul Durrell and Gary Brown
Prisoner Paul Durrell brought suit under Section 1983 for the
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.283 He claims that mental
and physical injuries resulted from an attack by his “aggressive
homosexual” cellmate.284 The district court hearing his claim
granted summary judgment for the defendants,285 holding that
Durrell’s injuries were not caused by the defendants’ deliberate
indifference.286 In August 2003, the Ninth Circuit reversed this
decision on the grounds that an issue of material fact existed as to
whether the defendants knew of and disregarded “conditions
posing a substantial risk of serious harm” to Durrell.287 The court’s
decision was based on information about Durrell’s cellmate that
279

42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(C) (2005). The Commission shall recommend
national standards relating to: “the preservation of physical and testimonial
evidence for use in an investigation of the circumstances relating to the rape.”
Id.
280
Id. § 15606(e)(2)(K). The Commission shall recommend national
standards relating to: “creating a system for reporting incidents of prison rape
that will ensure the confidentiality of prison rape complaints, protect inmates
who make prison rape complaints from retaliation, and assure the impartial
resolution of prison rape complaints.” Id.
281
See infra Part III.C.
282
See infra Part III.D.
283
Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718 (9th Cir. 2003).
284
Id. at 719.
285
Id. Defendants in the case include the director of the state department of
corrections, warden of the prison, “Captain of Housing Assignment” at the
facility, and others. Id.
286
Id.
287
Id.
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was available to the defendants. Records in the prison’s computer
database revealed that Durrell’s cellmate “had anally raped a
sixteen year-old boy, and showed his assaults on other inmates,
and a threat to rape another inmate.”288 The case was remanded to
the trial court, providing Durrell with the opportunity to prove that
the defendant prison officials and staff had caused him to be
housed “with a sexually aggressive cellmate” and that this
deliberate indifference to his safety caused his injury.289
Gary Brown, also a state inmate, is bringing a pro se complaint
under Section 1983 claiming that the supervisor of his cellblock
was deliberately indifferent to his health and safety and thus
deprived him of his Eighth Amendment rights.290 In 2004, a district
court denied a motion to dismiss his case as well as a motion for
summary judgment based on the supervisor’s qualified
immunity.291 Brown’s complaint is that the defendant denied his
request for a new cell assignment, which Brown made in light of
warnings by other prisoners that his newly assigned cellmate had
forced other inmates into performing sexual acts.292 The prison had
a policy of not double-celling inmates designated as potential
rapists, but the prison’s file on Brown’s cellmate did not indicate
that he was a threat.293 Three days after Brown’s request was
disregarded, he was sexually assaulted by his cellmate.294 He
brought a complaint requesting damages as well as declaratory and
injunctive relief.295
288

Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718, 719 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 720.
290
Brown v. Scott, 329 F. Supp. 2d 905 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
291
Id. at 906.
292
Id. at 907.
293
Id. For the cellmate to be classified as a “homosexual predator” who
could not be double-celled, required that his file have
a documented conviction, finding of guilt on a major misconduct, or
other verifiable supporting documentation contained in the prisoner’s
file (e.g. jail reports) which establishes the use of force or threat of
force to commit or attempt to commit a non-consensual sexual act with
a victim of the same sex who is at least 14 years of age.
Id.
294
Id.
295
Id. “The plaintiff requests in his complaint the issuance of declaratory
289

RIES MACROED CORRECTED 053105.DOC

THE PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT

6/6/2005 1:43 PM

975

B. Prevention of Inmate-on-Inmate Sexual Assaults
As the PREA is implemented, prisoners’ safety from sexual
assault will become a greater priority for prison managers and
staff, and inmates will find it easier to notify guards about
preventable rapes. National standards will be set for reporting
systems that inmates may use to notify prison staff of threats to
their safety.296 Standards will also be established for appropriate
staff responses to reports of threats of rape.297 If the defendant in
Brown’s case was acting under a national standard for the thorough
“investigation and resolution of complaints,”298 as provided for by
the PREA, Brown’s assault would have been prevented. Both
Brown and Durrell would also have been protected by a standard
for “the classification and assignment of prisoners, using proven
standardized instruments and protocols, in a manner that limits the
occurrence of prison rape,” as prescribed by the PREA.299
In a few federal circuits it already appears to be the law that
vulnerable prisoners should not be assigned housing with
potentially threatening cellmates.300 The PREA will prevent rapes
by making more considered inmate classifications standard
practice. In Durrell’s case, the prison’s own records revealed that
his cellmate had a history of sexual assault.301 In accordance with a
national standard on cell assignments designed to reduce inmateon-inmate rapes, such information would be accurate and would
regularly be consulted prior to a prisoner’s placement in housing,
rather than be consulted only in preparation for a civil trial. The
and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.” Id.
296
42 U.S.C. §§ 15606(e)(2)(J), 15606(e)(2)(K) (2005).
297
Id. § 15606(e)(2)(H).
298
Id.
299
Id. § 15606(e)(2). The Commission’s report on national standards “shall
include recommended national standards relating to— (A) the classification and
assignment of prisoners, using proven standardized instruments and protocols, in
a manner that limits the occurrence of prison rape” Id.
300
See supra Part II.C.
301
Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718, 719 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that
“the computer records indicate that [the cellmate] had anally raped a sixteen
year-old boy, and showed his assaults on other inmates, and a threat to rape
another inmate”).
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guard in Brown’s case followed minimal investigative procedures
and distinguished Brown’s request for protection from a request
for a cell reassignment.302 Brown needed to rely upon the guard in
his case to consider that inmate protection is related to cell
assignments.303 Under the PREA’s standards, the duty-to-protect
prisoners from sexual assault ought to be implicit in every cell
assignment.304
C. Liability for Failing to Protect Inmates from Preventable
Sexual Assaults
The PREA’s standards for improved prison management will
entail more specific duties for prison supervisors to prevent
inmate-on-inmate rapes, and the data generated by studies under
the statute will help prisoners enforce those duties through
litigation. As a result of the PREA’s acknowledgement of Farmer
302

Brown v. Scott, 329 F. Supp. 2d 905, 907-08 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
[T]he cellmate was eligible to be placed in a multiple occupancy
setting. Under the [state prisons’] policy, a prisoner designated as a
homosexual predator could not be placed in a “double-bunked” cell or
room. . . . Pursuant to [state] policy, a prisoner who requests protection
shall immediately be placed in a temporary segregation cell or other
suitable location. . . . However, according to the defendant, the plaintiff
did not seek protection, but rather he requested a change in cell
assignment . . . .

Id.
303

Id. at 907-08.
The defendant reviewed the plaintiff’s cell mate’s file and found that
the cell mate was not designated a homosexual predator, and pursuant
to Michigan Department of Correction (MDOC) policy, the cellmate
was eligible to be placed in a multiple occupancy setting. . . . The
defendant states that had [Brown] requested protection, the plaintiff
immediately would have been removed from his cell pursuant to
MDOC policy.
Id.
304

42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2) (2005). The Commission’s report on national
standards “shall include recommended national standards relating to— (A) the
classification and assignment of prisoners . . . in a manner that limits the
occurrence of prison rape.” Id.
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and of the Eighth Amendment concerns that arise when prisoners
are not protected against rape,305 supervisors will be responsible
for using the newly standardized practices to prevent against
sexual assault within their facilities.306 Those standards will be
useful to prisoners as plaintiffs when prison officials claim
qualified immunity, requiring inmates to show that the officials’
conduct was objectively unreasonable.307 Information from the
data collections ordered by the PREA will also assist prisoners in
overcoming the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s presumption
against the sufficiency of inmates’ claimed injuries.308 Inmate rape
victims will bring more successful lawsuits when the new data and
the new standards are used, in combination, to prove the objective
and subjective prongs of the Farmer deliberate indifference
standard.309
After the Attorney General issues a final rule on standards for
the prevention of prison rape, prison managers will have the duty
to implement practices recommended for the prevention of sexual
assault within their facilities.310 For example, in light of standards
for the implementation of more thorough classification and cellassignment systems, supervisors will have a duty to put such
systems into place.311 Supervisory liability could attach if an
305

Id. § 15601(13). “In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court ruled that
deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of sexual assault violates prisoners’
rights under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment.” Id. (citation omitted).
306
Id. § 15602(6) (stating that one purpose of the PREA is to “increase the
accountability of prison officials who fail to detect, prevent, reduce, and punish
prison rape”).
307
See supra text accompanying notes 54-58 (discussing qualified
immunity as a defense to § 1983 suits).
308
See supra text accompanying notes 106-09 (discussing the PLRA’s
injury requirements).
309
See infra text accompanying notes 325-42.
310
42 U.S.C. § 15602(6) (2005) (stating that one purpose of the PREA is to
“increase the accountability of prison officials who fail to detect, prevent,
reduce, and punish prison rape”).
311
Id. § 15606(e)(2). The Commission’s report on national standards “shall
include recommended national standards relating to— (A) the classification and
assignment of prisoners . . . in a manner that limits the occurrence of prison
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improper housing assignment is made by an inadequately trained
subordinate.312 Similarly, if the Attorney General’s standards
require improved reporting systems, supervisors will be
responsible for maintaining truly effective systems for evaluating
reports of sexual abuse.313 This is important for prisoners as
plaintiffs because the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that
use of the prisons’ complaint processes be exhausted before legal
redress can be sought.314 If inmates can report fears of rape
confidentially and more easily as a result of the PREA, this
requirement of prison litigation will be more easily met.315
Having stated proper legal claims, both Durrell and Brown still
faced obstacles in sustaining suits against supervisors at their
facilities, rather than lower-level staff.316 Lawsuits brought by rape
rape.” Id.
312
See supra Part II.C (discussing claims of this kind).
313
42 U.S.C. §§ 15606(e)(2)(J), 15606(e)(2)(K) (2005).
314
Id. § 1997(e) (2005); see also Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir.
2004) (holding, in a prisoner-rape case, that an inmate must pursue timely
grievances in accordance with the prison system’s formal process in order for
the court to consider administrative remedies exhausted). “As a general matter,
courts typically use a standard according to which a grievance should give
prison officials ‘fair notice’ of the problem that will form the basis of the
prisoner’s suit.” Id. at 516.
315
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(K) (requiring recommendations for
national standards for “creating a system for reporting incidents of prison rape
that will ensure the confidentiality of prison rape complaints, protect inmates
who make prison rape complaints from retaliation, and assure the impartial
resolution of prison rape complaints”), and id. at § 15606(e)(2)(B) (requiring
recommendations for national standards for “the investigation and resolution of
rape complaints by responsible prison authorities, local and State police, and
Federal and State prosecution authorities”), with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2005) (“No
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [section 1983], or
any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.”).
316
Though the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment for all defendants in Paul Durrell’s case, the
reversing decision stated that “[o]n remand, the district court is not precluded
from dismissing those defendants who had no personal involvement in housing
Durrell.” Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718, 720 (9th Cir. 2003). Gary
Brown’s original complaint named other prison officials as defendants, but all of
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victims against prison supervisors and state correctional officials
are often defeated through summary judgments based on the
immunity of the sued officials;317 however, the standards that result
from the PREA will prove useful in defeating the defense of
qualified immunity. Prison officials are granted qualified immunity
if a reasonable official in the same circumstances would not be
aware that his conduct violated a clearly-established right.318 The
Farmer decision established that being deliberately indifferent to a
prisoner’s protective needs in the face of a threat of rape violates a
clearly established Eighth Amendment right. Qualified immunity
will be denied, however, only when this right is violated in
circumstances that make an official’s conduct objectively
unreasonable.319 The issue that remains to be proven by plaintiffs
such as Durrell and Brown is whether prison supervisors acted
unreasonably in addressing circumstances that threatened their
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The PREA’s
national standards will provide courts with criteria outlining what
an objectively reasonable corrections official would do with the
knowledge that prison rapes occur in the prison system they
supervise.320 If the Attorney General’s standards are accepted as
indicia of reasonable efforts to prevent prison rape, then
noncompliance with those standards could strip officials of
immunity when they are deliberately indifferent to sexual assault
the defendants other than the one official to whom he reported were dismissed.
Brown v. Scott, 329 F. Supp. 2d 905, 907 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
317
For discussion of the pervasiveness of summary judgments in prison
rape litigation, see Brian Saccenti, Comment, Preventing Summary Judgment
against Inmates Who Have Been Sexually Assaulted by Showing That the Risk
Was Obvious, 59 MD. L. REV. 642 (2000).
318
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001).
319
Id. at 202. When a clearly-established right is violated, defendant
officials are denied qualified immunity where “it would be clear to a reasonable
official that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id.
320
42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(B) (requiring the Commission to recommend
national standards relating to “the investigation and resolution of rape
complaints by responsible prison authorities”); id. § 15606(e)(2)(H) (requiring
the Commission to recommend national standards relating to “the training of
correctional staff sufficient to ensure that they understand and appreciate the
significance of prison rape and the necessity of its eradication”).
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in the facilities that they manage.321
Likewise, the PREA will make knowledge about the threat of
prison rape sufficiently widespread that awareness of the
information generated by the Act may be imputed to reasonable
officials. The legislation calls for standards that will provide for
“the training of correctional staff sufficient to ensure that they
understand and appreciate the significance of prison rape and the
necessity of its eradication.”322 Under this standard, every
reasonable prison guard will recognize sexual assault as a rights
violation and know of his duty to prevent it. Supervisors of
corrections systems will have knowledge of best practices for
preventing rape in the prisons they oversee because the reports of
the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission and the final
rule on standards issued by the Attorney General will both be sent
directly to state departments of corrections.323 The administrative
data collection ordered by the PREA also will establish that
reasonable corrections officials should know the objective
indicators that prisoners are vulnerable to rape in their facilities.324
321

Cf. Amanda K. Eaton, Optical Illusions: The Hazy Contours of the
Clearly Established Law and the Effects of Hope v. Pelzer on the Qualified
Immunity Doctrine, 38 GA. L. REV. 661, 705-06 (2004) (discussing the use of a
Department of Justice report as evidence rebutting the defendants’ motion of
summary judgment based on qualified immunity). The Supreme Court
“concluded that, although the DOJ’s views were not binding, nor were they
communicated to the particular officers in question, the recommendations
against the officers’ actions were enough to lead a reasonable officer to realize
that [the alleged conduct] was a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id.; see
also Alison Chin, Hope v. Pelzer: Increasing the Accountability of State Actors
in Prison Systems – A Necessary Enterprise in Guaranteeing the Eighth
Amendment Rights of Prison Inmates, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), 93 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 913, 946 (2003) (arguing that Hope v. Pelzer “expanded the
sources of fair notice in its inclusion of the DOJ [report]”).
322
42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(H) (2005).
323
Id. § 15606(d)(3)(A) (instructing the Commission to submit its
“Comprehensive Study of the Impacts of Prison Rape” to “the head of the
department of corrections of each state”); id. § 15607(a)(4) (instructing the
Attorney General to submit the final rule on national standards on prison rape
reduction to “the head of the department of corrections of each state”).
324
“The 2004 administrative collection will provide an understanding of
what corrections officials know, what information is recorded, how allegations
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Beyond defeating claims for qualified immunity, these same
reports and standards may be used to establish an official’s liability
for deliberate indifference.
Under the Farmer deliberate indifference standard, prison
officials cannot be held liable for failing to prevent a violation of
an inmate’s rights unless they first are found to have been aware of
“conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm” to
prisoners.325 The information that is generated under the PREA
will buttress prisoner claims under this objective prong of the
standard.326 The Commission will report on the effects of prison
rape on victims generally, thus further establishing the serious
harm that a risk of rape creates.327 Additionally, the increased
availability of data confirming the connection between prison rape
and the spread of HIV among prisoners could create a presumption
that a risk of sexual assault poses a risk of serious harm.328
and confirmed incidents are handled.” BJS REPORT, supra note 209, at 3. 42
U.S.C. § 15603(b) (2005) (mandating that the Review Panel on Prison Rape
hold hearings for “the identification of common characteristics of prisons and
prison systems with a high incidence of prison rape”).
325
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). “For a claim (like the one
here) based on a failure to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id.
(citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)).
326
42 U.S.C. § 15606(d) (2005). Congress detailed matters to be included
in the Commission’s study:
Comprehensive Study of the Impacts of Prison Rape . . . an assessment
of the extent to which the incidence of prison rape contributes to the
spread of sexually transmitted diseases and to the transmission of HIV;
. . . an assessment of the impacts of prison rape on individuals, families,
social institutions and the economy generally, including an assessment
of the extent to which the incidence of prison rape contributes to
recidivism and to increased incidence of sexual assault; . . . an
assessment of the general relationship between prison rape and prison
violence.
Id.
327
Id. § 15606(d).
328
“[In 2001, t]he percentage of deaths due to AIDS was more than 2 times
higher in the prison population than in the U.S. general population ages 15-54.
In 2001 about 1 in every 10 prisoner deaths were attributable to AIDS-related
causes compared to 1 in 22 deaths in the general population.” HIV IN PRISONS
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Increased information about the effects of prison rape will aid
prisoners in meeting the requirements of the PLRA, which they
must do or else have their claim dismissed.329 One requirement of
the PLRA is that inmates claiming mental or emotional injuries
must provide evidence of physical injury.330 For a plaintiff such as
Brown, whose aggressor did successfully rape him, a claim of
emotional distress relies not just on the existence of evidence of his
physical injury but also on evidence that psychological effects
generally occur from prison rape. When implemented, the PREA
will provide such evidence.331 In contrast, Durrell claimed that he
suffered mental injuries from an attempted sexual assault.332 A
2002, supra note 222, at 7. In New York’s state prison system, where roughly
eight percent of prisoners are known to be HIV-positive, awareness of incidents
of rape should be considered knowledge of conditions posing a substantial risk
of serious harm. HIV IN PRISONS 2001, supra note 9, at 2; HIV IN PRISONS 2002,
supra note 222, at 2 (finding that New York, Florida and Texas “housed nearly
half of all HIV-infected inmates in state prisons in 2002”). Considering whether
conditions of confinement amount to a constitutional rights violation “requires
that a court assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains
of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose
anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36
(1993). Applying this requirement to a risk of contracting AIDS, courts would
be hard pressed to reason that exposure to HIV conforms with standards of
decency. See Richard D. Vetstein, Note, Rape and AIDS in Prison: On a
Collision Course to a New Death Penalty, 30 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 863, 899-900
(1997) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s standards from the “‘disease’ line
of [prison condition] cases” could be applied to prisoner rape and the threat of
HIV-infection).
329
See supra Part I.C. (discussing the impact of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act’s requirements on prisoner suits for rape).
330
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2005). “No Federal civil action may be brought
by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental
or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of
physical injury.” Id.
331
Id. § 15603(c)(2)(A). The Review Panel on Prison Rape established by
the PREA will issue reports “psychological data” on “the effects of prison rape.”
Id.
332
Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718, 719 (9th Cir. 2003). “Durrell
claims he was subjected to ‘overwhelming mental and emotional stress’ from
being housed with the sexually aggressive cellmate. . . . . A genuine issue of
material fact exists as to whether the injury suffered by Durrell was caused by
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claim like Durrell’s will be easier to sustain after the
implementation of the PREA, if the Attorney General’s standards
instruct prison officials to conduct psychological examinations
following all incidents of sexual assault, whether an assault was
successful or not.333
By providing evidence of prison conditions at specific
facilities,334 the PREA also will aid prisoners in establishing
supervisory liability under the subjective prong of deliberate
indifference—that a defendant official was in fact aware of the risk
to inmate safety and disregarded it.335 The data collections on the
incidence of sexual assaults in individual prisons will provide
officials at these facilities with concrete information regarding the
risks faced by inmates.336 This also will be true for state
corrections departments that receive grants under the PREA.337 In
deliberate indifference to his safety.” Id.
333
42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(D) (2005) (requiring recommended standards
for physical and mental examinations of inmates following sexual assault).
334
Id. § 15603(b). The Review Panel on Prison Rape shall hold hearings
for “the identification of common characteristics of prisons and prison systems
with a high incidence of prison rape.” Id. Grantees under the PREA must report
“the number of incidents of prison rape, and the grantees response to such
incidents.” Id. § 15605(e). The Commission is required to recommend national
standards relating to “data collection and reporting of—(i) prison rape.” Id. §
15606(e)(2)(L).
335
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment
for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,
and he must also draw the inference.
Id.
336
The reports that Congress is to receive from the Attorney General under
the PREA will have prisons “ranked according to the incidence of prison rape in
each institution.” 42 U.S.C. § 15603(c)(2)(B) (2005). “The first facility-level
measures of sexual assault using victim self-reports from a national sample of
federal and state prisoners, local jail inmates, persons held in juvenile facilities,
and former inmates will be collected for calendar year 2006.” BJS REPORT,
supra note 209, at 5.
337
Grantees under the PREA must prepare reports for the Attorney General
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addition, the national standards should make prison authorities
responsible for maintaining records not only of incidents of sexual
assault, but also of inmate complaints and staff responses.338 The
defendant in Brown’s lawsuit was denied summary judgment
because “a trier of fact could reasonably find that the defendant
was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff existed.”339
Inferences such as these will be more probable when reliable data
exists regarding the prevalence of rape in prisons.The specificity of
both the Attorney General’s and the Commission’s standards will
ultimately determine their usefulness in holding individual
supervisors accountable for deliberate indifference to prison rape.
The Supreme Court noted in Bell v. Wolfish that the
recommendations of the ACA “do not establish the constitutional
minima” for prison officials’ duties.340 Courts may, however,
measure the conduct of prison officials against statewide or
individual facility correctional policies.341 The Attorney General’s
that include “the number of incidents of prison rape, and the grantee’s response
to such incidents.” 42 U.S.C. § 15605(e)(1)(A) (2005).
338
Id. § 15606(e)(2)(B) (requiring the Commission to recommend national
standards relating to “the investigation and resolution of rape complaints by
responsible prison authorities”); id. § 15606(e)(2)(L) (requiring the Commission
to recommend national standards relating to “data collection and reporting of . . .
(iii) the resolution of prison rape complaints by prison officials and Federal,
State, and local investigation and prosecution authorities”).
339
Brown v. Scott, 329 F. Supp. 2d 905, 912 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (denying
the defendant’s motions for dismissal and for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity).
340
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543 n.27 (1979) (stating that “while the
recommendations of these various groups [including the American Correctional
Association] may be instructive in certain cases, they simply do not establish the
constitutional minima; rather they establish goals recommended by the
organization in question”).
341
See Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 761 (10th Cir. 1999); Giroux v.
Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 1999) (using a jail’s policy covering
“Special Management Inmates” to reverse summary judgment granted to
defendants by a lower court because “[a] juror could find that [defendant’s]
abdication of his responsibility, in the face of such a known danger to
[plaintiff’s] safety was a reckless dereliction of duty rising to the level of Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference”); Skinner v. Uphoff, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1208,
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prison rape standards should at least be persuasive evidence of the
specific duties of prison officials to prevent inmate-on-inmate
sexual assaults, because those standards will be adopted by all
penal accreditation organizations.342 The standards will be most
meaningful—both for prevention and to victims who bring suits—
if the standards are eventually incorporated into state correctional
policies as well.
D. Remedies Available to Prisoner-Victims of Assault
Under Farmer, plaintiffs may sue for injunctions or damages,
and this new federal legislation should assist inmates who seek
either remedy.343 As a result of the PREA, more hard data will
become available for inmate-plaintiffs to present as evidence,
including evidence of practices that successfully reduce rape, such
as the programs in place at prisons with low incidence.344 The
standards of the Attorney General could soon take the place of
expert testimony as a means of establishing for juries that wardens
disregarded their duty to supervise or train prison staff.345 The
specificity of those standards will determine whether juries can
infer deliberate indifference based primarily on prison conditions
1214, 1218 (D. Wyo. 2002) (using a prison’s own Administrative Regulation in
granting summary judgment to the plaintiff class because the defendants failed
to protect their safety).
342
42 U.S.C. § 15608 (2005).
343
Krein v. Norris, 309 F.3d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 2002). “A violation of the
Eighth Amendment right recognized in Farmer v. Brennan may be the basis for
an award of money damages as well as injunctive relief.” Id. (citing Newman v.
Holmes, 122 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1997)).
344
The Review Panel on Prison Rape established by the PREA will issue
reports to Congress identifying “institutions in the representative sample that
appear to have been successful in deterring prison rape.” 42 U.S.C. §
15603(b)(3) (2005). Also, the Bureau of Justice Statistics will be collecting
administrative records from 3,269 facilities in 2004. BJS REPORT, supra note
209, at 3.
345
Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(relying on an investigative committee report because no expert testimony was
presented at trial, a jury found that “the misconduct/assault [against plaintiff]
was effected due to, among other things, poorly trained supervisors”)
(quotations omitted).
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and the supervision, training or discipline in place at a particular
facility.346
Compensatory damage awards for negligent supervision must
be based on physical injuries demonstrated by plaintiffs,347 and the
Act will assist plaintiffs in proving such injuries.348 For Durrell,
who alleged physical injuries sustained while defending himself
from an assault by his cellmate, the ability to present evidence of
physical injury is critical to his case.349 Under the PREA, national
standards mandating the performance of medical examinations
after sexual assaults and the maintenance of better records, will
work to preserve evidence of physical injuries.350 As investigations
and administrative records become more thorough, compensatory
damages will be more accurately calculated.351
346

See Spruce v. Sargent, 149 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding in the
case of an inmate subjected to repeated sexual assaults, “if a plaintiff presents
evidence of very obvious and blatant circumstances indicating that the defendant
knew the risk existed, the jury may properly infer that the official must have
known”); Ware v. Jackson County, 150 F.3d 873, 881 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding
that, on complaint against general conditions of female inmates being abused by
prison staff, “the jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence of a
continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of unconstitutional conduct”).
347
See supra note 107.
348
42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(C) (2005) (calling for national standards to
have prisons undertake “the preservation of physical and testimonial evidence
for use in an investigation of the circumstances relating to the rape”); id. §
15606(e)(2)(D) (calling for standards for the performance of physical and
psychological examinations as follow-up to sexual assaults).
349
Durrell v. Cook, 71 Fed. Appx. 718, 719 (9th Cir. 2003). “[Durrell]
claims that he was injured defending himself from his cellmate, and sought
medical attention for his injury (though this is disputed).” Id. at 719.
350
42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2) (The Commission’s recommendations to the
Attorney General “shall include recommended national standards relating to . . .
(D) acute-term trauma care for rape victims, including standards relating to— (i)
the manner and extent of physical examination and treatment to be provided to
any rape victim” as well as “(L) data collection and reporting of— (i) prison
rape”).
351
42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2)(B) (requiring the Commission to recommend
national standards relating to “the investigation and resolution of rape
complaints by responsible prison authorities”); id. § 15606(e)(2)(L) (requiring
the Commission to recommend national standards relating to “data collection
and reporting”)
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With specific practice standards in place, punitive damages
may become more readily available to plaintiffs and could be
assessed relative to a prison’s compliance with the PREA.352
Credibility issues may present an obstacle to prison litigants
seeking punitive damage awards.353 Thus, the extent to which a
plaintiff such as Brown can demonstrate that his assault resulted
from a prison’s noncompliance with national standards for the
conduct of corrections officers may determine his expectancy of a
punitive damage award. If the Attorney General’s standards reflect
the subjects identified by Congress, thorough investigations of
complaints such as Brown’s will be required.354 If a defendant
knowingly disregards a threat to a prisoner in contravention of a
national standard, punitive damages could be awarded.
Injunctive relief and declaratory relief also will be easier to
obtain once the PREA is implemented because a continuation of
current practices would help to prove a likelihood of future
harm.355 The Review Panel on Prison Rape will hold hearings for
“the identification of common characteristics of prisons and prison
systems with a high incidence of prison rape.”356 In facilities where
these characteristics are present, a risk of future inmate-on-inmate
sexual assault could be proven. Brown sought declaratory relief in
his suit and this may be an effective remedy for a prisoner at risk
from his housing assignment. Admittedly, it is unlikely that a pro
se complaint to challenge a cell assignment would be heard in time

352

See Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 445 (D.C. Cir.
2000); Stokes v. Delacambre, 710 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirming jury
awards for compensatory and punitive damages where defendants failed to
protect plaintiff from sexual assault in jail).
353
James v. Tilghman, 194 F.R.D. 408, 419 (D. Conn. 1999) (affirming
jury award of nominal damages for plaintiff, an inmate who was double-celled
with a known sexual predator, because “there were legitimate credibility issues
over plaintiff’s behavior and claim for damages”).
354
42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2) (The Commission’s recommendations to the
Attorney General “shall include recommended national standards relating to . . .
(B) the investigation and resolution of rape complaints by responsible prison
authorities”).
355
42 U.S.C. § 15603(b) (2005).
356
Id.
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for a prisoner to be spared from an assault.357 Where administrative
grievances do not satisfactorily provide prisoners with a challenge
to their cell assignments, however, prisoner suits for declaratory
judgment should be accepted by courts.358 Under a national
standard for “the classification and assignment of prisoners . . . in a
manner that limits the occurrence of prisoner rape,”359 Gary Brown
could have filed sooner for a declaratory judgment that prison
officials were deliberately indifferent to his reported threat.
Inmates presently may bring class action suits for structural
injunctive relief by challenging conditions at a facility.360 Where
supervisors are held liable for failure to train, failure to supervise,
or failure to discipline, it is within the authority of federal courts to
grant injunctive relief to ensure that measures are taken to correct
357

David M. Adlerstein, Note, In Need of Correction: The “Iron Triangle”
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1691 (2001)
(stating that “the mean processing time of prisoner Section 1983 suits is 181
days”); id. (citing ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K. DALEY, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, CHALLENGING THE CONDITIONS OF PRISONS & JAILS: A REPORT ON
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 21, 22 (1994)).
358
This argument is made in regard to prisoner suits for monetary damages
under the PLRA in Branham, supra note 101.
Under [statutory predecessors of the PLRA], plaintiffs need not process
a claim through an administrative tribunal if they cannot obtain the type
of relief they are seeking from that tribunal. This interpretation of the
exhaustion requirement, under which “administrative remedies” means
something different than “administrative grievance procedures,” would
also be in keeping with the different terminology found in subsections
(a) and (b) of 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). . . . The question raised by [the
PLRA] is whether the deletion of the statutory predicates to exhaustion
. . . means that a prisoner can be required to exhaust administrative
remedies even when those remedies cannot repair or avert the harm of
which the inmate complains.
Id. at 545-46.
359
42 U.S.C. § 15606(e)(2) (2005).
360
Skinner v. Uphoff, 209 F.R.D. 484, 489 (D. Wyo. 2002) (granting
conditional certification of class of prisoners pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)
and holding that “[i]t is well established that civil rights actions are the
paradigmatic 23(b)(2) class suits, for they seek classwide structural relief that
would clearly redound equally to the benefit of each class member”) (citing
Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565 F.2d 975, 979 n.9 (7th Cir. 1977)).
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Eighth Amendment violations.361 The PREA should encourage
courts to do so. The decision in Farmer requires that an inmate
demonstrate deliberate indifference throughout litigation and into
the future in order for an injunction to be granted.362 However, the
presence of HIV in the prisons makes a claim for equitable relief
stronger, as a single exposure from a single incident of sexual
assault can cause an inmate irreparable harm.363 If courts are to
enforce the standards of the PREA, they will have to regard
Congress’s intent to eliminate sexual assaults.364 By focusing
prison officials on prevention rather than liability, injunctive relief
can prevent further harm where officials remain indifferent.365
361

Skinner v. Uphoff, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1218 (D. Wyo. 2002). In
granting judgment for plaintiff inmates on claims that prison officials failed to
protect them from assault, the court wrote:
Of course, the remedy ordered by this Court “shall extend no further
than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,” [quoting
the Prison Litigation Reform Act] but if it is necessary to enact
systemic and prophylactic measures in order to correct the violations
found to exist in this instance, the Court may do so.
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3626; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978)).
362
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 (1994) (“[T]o establish eligibility
for an injunction, the inmate must demonstrate the continuance of that disregard
[of a risk of assault] during the remainder of the litigation and into the future.”).
363
Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 109 (2d Cir. 1981) (“. . . it is . . .
unnecessary to require evidence that an infectious disease has actually spread in
an overcrowded jail before issuing a remedy.”).
364
42 U.S.C. § 15602 (2005).
The purposes of this Act are to —
(1) establish a zero-tolerance standard for the incidence of prison rape
in prisons in the United States;
(2) make the prevention of prison rape a top priority in each prison
system; . . .
(6) increase the accountability of prison officials who fail to detect,
prevent, reduce, and punish prison rape;
(7) protect the Eighth Amendment rights of Federal, State, and local
prisoners . . .
Id.
365

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846-47 (“If the court finds the Eighth
Amendment’s subjective and objective requirements satisfied, it may grant
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CONCLUSION
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Farmer v. Brennan,
inmates who are raped in prison by fellow inmates may have their
Eighth Amendment constitutional rights vindicated when they can
show that prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to
the threat those inmates faced. Obstacles in reporting and recording
injuries, the deference typically afforded to prisons supervisors, the
defense of immunity that is available to corrections officers, and
the limited remedies available to prisoners have all hindered
inmates in holding prison officials responsible for sexual assaults.
In response to the pervasiveness of inmate-on-inmate sexual
assault, Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003
to collect data on the incidence of sexual abuse in correctional
facilities and to create the National Prison Rape Elimination
Commission, which will recommend national standards for the
prevention of prison rape. In addition to relying on the
implementation of this Act to relieve the threat of rape in prisons,
inmates should be able to use the data and recommendations that
are a result of the new federal law to bring stronger claims against
prison officials who fail in their duty to protect prisoners against
sexual assault by other prisoners.

appropriate injunctive relief. Of course, a district court should approach issuance
of injunctive orders with the usual caution . . . by giving prison officials time to
rectify the situation before issuing an injunction.”) (citations omitted).

